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The Opacity of Transparency 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The normative concept of transparency, along with the open government laws that 
purport to create a transparent public system of governance promise the world—a democratic 
and accountable state above all, and a peaceful, prosperous, and efficient one as well.  But 
transparency, in its role as the theoretical justification for a set of legal commands, frustrates all 
parties affected by its ambiguities and abstractions.  The public’s engagement with transparency 
in practice yields denials of reasonable requests for essential government information, as well as 
government meetings that occur behind closed doors.  Meanwhile, state officials bemoan the 
significantly impaired decision-making processes that result from complying with transparency’s 
sweeping and powerful legal mandates, and complain about transparency’s enormous 
compliance costs.     
 
This article argues that the frustrations with creating an open government originate in the 
concept of “transparency” itself, which fails to consider the tensions it conceals.  The easy 
embrace of transparency as a basis for normative and utilitarian ends evades more difficult 
questions:  When is transparency most important as an administrative norm? To what extent 
should an agency be held to that norm?  Open government laws fall short in answering these 
questions because, relying on the assumptions of “transparency,” they typically operate at 
exceptionally high levels of abstraction.  As a result, they establish both broad mandates for 
disclosure and broad authority for the exercise of a state privilege of non-disclosure, and they 
ultimately fail to produce an effective, mutually acceptable level of administrative openness.  
Transparency theory’s flaws result from a simplistic model of linear communication which 
assumes that information, once set free from the state that creates it, will produce an informed, 
engaged public that will hold officials accountable.  To the extent that this model fails to 
describe accurately the state, government information, and the public, as well as the 
communications process of which they are component parts, it provides a flawed basis for open 
government laws. 
 
The article critiques the assumptions embedded in transparency theory and suggests an 
alternative approach to open government laws that would allow a more flexible, sensitive means 
to evaluate the costs and benefits of information disclosure.  It also proposes institutional 
alternatives to the current default regime in open government laws, which relies on weak judicial 
enforcement of disclosure mandates, and offers substantive suggestions that would improve 
efforts to establish a more accountable state and informed public. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
By any commonsense estimation, governmental transparency, defined simply and 
broadly as a governing institution’s openness to the gaze of others,1 is clearly among the 
pantheon of great political virtues.2  A fundamental attribute of democracy,3 a norm of human 
rights,4 a tool to promote political and economic prosperity and to curb corruption,5 and a means 
to enable effective relations between nation states,6 transparency appears to provide such a 
remarkable array of benefits that no right-thinking politician, administrator, policy wonk, or 
academic could be against it.7  But transparency is not merely a political norm; candidates, 
partisans, and activists utilize it as a rhetorical rallying cry and weapon to promise full-scale 
political and social redemption.8  Contentious political campaigns and popular political 
consciousness seethe with allegations that government officials engage in secret, corrupt 
                                                 
1  See OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (defining transparent, in its figurative uses, as both “[f]rank, open, 
candid, ingenuous,” and “[e]asily seen through, recognized, understood, or detected”). 
2  For purposes of this Article, except where noted otherwise I use “transparency” to refer to the openness of 
the federal and state Executive Branch to the public.  Openness is also an issue in other contexts, such as between 
branches of the government (and particularly between Congress and the President), between the judiciary and the 
public, and between corporations and their shareholders (as well as the public).  While my discussion of 
transparency may be applicable in some respects to those other contexts, each raises many distinct theoretical and 
legal issues and all are outside this Article’s scope.  On the interbranch informational dispute, see, for example, 
William P. Marshall, The Limits on Congress’s Authority to Investigate the President, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 781 
(2004).  On efforts to impose transparency norms on corporations for the general public good, see MARY GRAHAM, 
DEMOCRACY BY DISCLOSURE: THE RISE OF TECHNOPOPULISM (2000); Archon Fung et al., The Political Economy of 
Transparency: What Makes Disclosure Policies Sustainable?, John F. Kennedy School of Government Faculty 
Research Working Papers Series #RWP03-039, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=384922; Cass R. Sunstein, 
Informational Regulation and Informational Standing: Akins and Beyond, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 613, 618-24 (1999).  
On the value of transparency for the corporation itself and its shareholders, see DON TAPSCOTT & DAVID TICOLL, 
THE NAKED CORPORATION 62-93 (2003); but see Get Naked, THE ECONOMIST Oct. 18, 2003, at 66 (noting doubts as 
to whether absolute transparency would make a functional, better corporation).  On the constitutional basis for 
public access to court proceedings, see Jonathan L. Hafetz, The First Amendment and the Right of Access to 
Deportation Proceedings, 40 CAL. W. L. REV. 265, 269-89 (2004). 
3  See infra Part I.A.1. 
4  See TOBY MENDEL, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION: A COMPARATIVE LEGAL SURVEY, at iii-vii (2003), at 
http://www.article19.org/docimages/1707.pdf (last visited, May 15, 2004); Stephen Sedley, Information as a Human 
Right, in FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND FREEDOM OF INFORMATION 239 (Jack Beatson & Yvonne Cripps eds., 
2000). 
5  See Robert Martin and Estelle Feldman, Access to Information in Developing Countries, ch.  5 (Working 
Paper, Transparency International, 1998), at http://www.transparency.org/working_papers/martin-
feldman/index.html (last visited, May 15, 2004);  
6  See Alasdair Roberts, A Partial Revolution: The Diplomatic Ethos and Transparency in Intergovernmental 
Organizations, 64 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 408 (2004); Frederick M. Abbott, NAFTA and the Legalization of World 
Politics: A Case Study, 54 INT’L ORG 519, 529-31 (2000). 
7  On transparency’s emergence in the past decade as a core concept of governance, see Thomas Blanton, The 
World’s Right to Know, FOREIGN POLICY, July 2002, at 50.     
8  See Geoffrey H. Hartman, A Note on Plain Speech and Transparency, 14 LAW & LIT. 25, 28 (2002) 
(sarcastically characterizing transparency as promising an authenticity that will allow the truth to “rise to the surface 
like cream, and so to abolish the esoteric in human contact and communication”). 
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activities (if not full-scale conspiracies), and overflow with promises that sufficient organization, 
popular will, and correct leadership will finally provide citizens with the responsive, trustworthy, 
and, above all, knowable government they deserve.   
 
Nevertheless, transparency’s status as a legal obligation for government entities in the 
U.S. and as an individual right for American citizens is remarkably vague.9  And notwithstanding 
occasional periods of openness, government seems eternally resistant to disclosure.10  Current 
political developments—specifically, the Bush administration’s efforts to control the flow of 
information from the Executive Branch11 and post-September 11 concerns that government 
                                                 
9  There is no individual right of access to government information in the U.S. Constitution.  See Pell v. 
Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 834 (1974); Manogg v. Stickle, 181 F.3d 102 (6th Cir. 1999); Martin D. Halstuk, Policy of 
Secrecy-Pattern of Deception: What Federalist Leaders Thought About a Public Right to Know, 1794-98, 7 COMM. 
L. & POL'Y 51, 74-76 (2002); but cf. Heidi Kitrosser, Secrecy in the Immigration Courts and Beyond: Considering 
the Right To Know in the Administrative State, 39 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 95, 125-45 (2004) (arguing that access 
rights fall under liberal democratic conceptions of free speech rights as enabling self-government and checking 
government abuses, and thus should receive First Amendment protection).  The Supreme Court has found a limited 
First Amendment right of access to criminal trials and pre-trial proceedings, however.  See Richmond Newspapers, 
Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980).  Congress is subject to some constitutional transparency requirements in the 
Journal Clause, which mandates that each house keep a “Journal of its Proceedings, and from time to time publish 
the same, excepting such Parts as may in their Judgment require Secrecy,” and, where one-fifth of those present at a 
vote agree, record the results of any vote. U.S. Const., art I, § 5, cl. 3.  For a fuller treatment of congressional 
transparency, see Adrian Vermeule, The Constitutional Law of Congressional Procedure, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 361, 
410-22 (2004). 
Rather than a federal constitutional mandate, the vast body of federal open government laws are statutory and 
provide, with enumerated exceptions, disclosure of federal records and open meetings.  See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552 
(Freedom of Information Act, requiring, with exceptions, that each federal agency shall make information available 
to the public upon request); 5 U.S.C. § 552b (Government in the Sunshine Act, requiring , with exceptions, that 
every meeting of an agency shall be open to public observation).  Some states have adopted constitutional provisions 
granting a right to access, while all have statutes that perform analogous functions as the federal FOIA and 
Government in the Sunshine Acts.  See, e.g., Cal. Const. Art. I, 3(b)(1) (granting “the right of access to information 
concerning the conduct of the people's business”); Fla. Const. Art. I, 24 (granting “the right to inspect or copy any 
public record made or received in connection with the official business of any public body, officer, or employee of 
the state, or persons acting on their behalf”); Note, Laura Schenck, Freedom of Information Statutes: The Unfulfilled 
Legacy, 8 FED. COMM. L.J. 371, 772-73 n.7 (1996) (listing state freedom of information statutes).      
10  For accounts of the federal government’s resistance to disclosure, see Thomas Blanton, Beyond the 
Balancing Test: National Security and Open Government in the United States, in NATIONAL SECURITY AND OPEN 
GOVERNMENT: STRIKING THE RIGHT BALANCE 33, 34-54 (Campbell Public Affairs Institute, Maxwell School of 
Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University, 2003); Christina E. Wells, “National Security” Information 
and the Freedom of Information Act, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 1195, 1201 (2004).  The best evidence of generalized 
frustration at the state level is the existence of the National Freedom of Information Coalition, an organized network 
of member groups around the countries that advocate for stronger open government laws and to force state and local 
agency compliance with them.  See National Freedom of Information Coalition, Our Mission, available at 
http://www.nfoic.org/Mission.html. 
11  One recent self-described “polemic” that summarizes the allegations and arguments relating to the Bush 
administration’s efforts to control government information is JOHN W. DEAN, WORSE THAN WATERGATE: THE 
SECRET PRESIDENCY OF GEORGE W. BUSH, at xiv (2004); see also John D. Podesta, Shadow Creep: Government 
Secrecy Since 9/11, 2002 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 361, 370-72 (2002) (criticizing the Bush Administration’s 
approach to government secrecy, both before and after the events of September 11, 2001); Note, Bradley Pack, 
FOIA Frustration: Access to Government Records Under the Bush Administration, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 815 (2004). 
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information disclosure might breach homeland security12—portend a new period of 
“retrenchment” (one begun during the latter years of the Clinton Administration) in the oft-
delayed march towards transparency’s promise.13  The Bush Administration may occasionally 
express its commitment to openness,14 as do most courts when they review challenges to 
government agencies’ refusals to disclose information.15  But when executive officers and 
                                                 
12  See Nancy Chang, How Democracy Dies: The War on Our Civil Liberties, in LOST LIBERTIES: ASHCROFT 
AND THE ASSAULT ON PERSONAL FREEDOM 33, 36-39 (Cynthia Brown ed., 2003); Stephen Gidiere & Jason 
Forrester, Balancing Homeland Security and Freedom of Information, 16 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 139 (2002); 
Wells, supra note 10, at 1197; Keith Anderson, Note, Is There Still A “Sound Legal Basis?”: The Freedom of 
Information Act in the Post-9/11 World, 4 OHIO ST. L.J. 1605 (2003); Kristen Elizabeth Uhl, Note, The Freedom of 
Information Act Post-9/11: Balancing the Public’s Right to Know, Critical Infrastructure Protection, and Homeland 
Security, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 261 (2003).   
 Following the September 11 attacks, the Bush administration has withdrawn from public access 
information about certain immigration cases and publications that had previously been available from federal 
government websites, and has sought to tighten access to information relating to weapons of mass destruction and 
“other information that could be misused to harm the security of our nation or threaten public safety.”  
Memorandum from Andrew Card, Assistant to the President and Chief of Staff, to Heads of Executive Departments 
and Agencies (Mar. 19, 2002), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oip/foiapost/2002foiapost10.htm; FEDERAL 
RESEARCH DIVISION, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, LAWS AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING THE PROTECTION OF SENSITIVE 
BUT UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION (2004), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/library/sbu.pdf; Patrice McDermott, 
Withhold and Control: Information in the Bush Administration, 12 KAN. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 671, 672-74 (2003).  
During the first George W. Bush Administration, the number of documents classified has increased considerably 
than during the Clinton Administration, while the number of documents that have been declassified has decreased in 
a corresponding fashion.  See Gregg Sangillo, Incarceration of Information? NAT’L J. Oct. 3, 2004.  Congress has 
also expanded executive agency powers to withhold information from the public.  Critics allege that the Critical 
Information Infrastructure Act, passed as part of the Homeland Security Act, will inhibit disclosure of information 
about the risks and safety hazards posed by utilities, gas pipeline operations, and similar industrial infrastructure that 
had previously been available under state and federal law.  See Homeland Security Act of 2002 § 214, 6 U.S.C. § 
133; John Gibeaut, The Paperwork War on Terrorism, ABA J., Oct. 2003, 63, 67-68; Brett Stohs, Protecting the 
Homeland by Exemption: Why the Critical Information Infrastructure Information Act of 2002 Will Degrade the 
Freedom of Information Act, 2002 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 0018, available at 
http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/dltr/articles/2002dltr0018.html. 
13  See Blanton, supra note 10, at 51-54 (describing secrecy during the current Bush Administration, and 
arguing that it began during Clinton’s second term); Jonathan Turley, Paradise Lost: The Clinton Administration 
and the Erosion of Executive Privilege, 60 MD. L. REV. 205 (2001) (condemning Clinton Administration’s reliance 
on sweeping executive privilege claims to keep information about White House activities secret). 
14  See, e.g., John Ashcroft, Memorandum for Heads of All Federal Departments and Agencies on the 
Freedom of Information Act (Oct. 12, 2001), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/04foia/011012.htm (declaring that, 
“[i]t is only through a well-informed citizenry that the leaders of our nation remain accountable to the governed and 
the American people can be assured that neither fraud nor government waste is concealed,” while also advising 
agencies that DOJ will defend decisions to deny FOIA requests “unless they lack a sound legal basis or present an 
unwarranted risk of adverse impact on the ability of other agencies to protect other important records”). 
15  See, e.g., NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 242 (1978) (noting that “[t]he basic purpose 
of FOIA is to ensure an informed citizenry, vital to the functioning of a democratic society, needed to check against 
corruption and to hold the governors accountable to the governed,” before proceeding to affirm denial of FOIA 
request on the ground that the witness statements in an unfair labor practices hearing before the National Labor 
Relations Board fell within a FOIA exception because its release would interfere with enforcement proceedings); 
Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 80 (1973) (characterizing FOIA as “broadly conceived” 
and intended “to permit access to official information long shielded unnecessarily from public view and . . . to create 
a judicially enforceable public right to secure such information from possibly unwilling official hands,” before 
proceeding to hold that an agency’s classification of documents may not be reviewed by court in camera). 
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agencies routinely deny access to the government’s inner workings on the grounds that some 
exception or other privilege overrides a statutory disclosure requirement, open government 
seems more like a distant, deferred ideal than an actually existing practice.16 
 
This regular departure from a principle that is so universally embraced and so apparently 
magical in its presumed effects seems anomalous and exasperating.  In fact, all parties to the 
uncertain reach of transparency find the legal obligations and enforcement mechanisms of open 
government laws to be immensely frustrating.  In the federal and state systems, those who 
request information under the various freedom of information and “sunshine” statutes regularly 
face delays and blanket denials.17  The result of one recent public poll sponsored by open 
government advocates found widespread concern that government secrecy is pervasive and that 
the public has too little access to public records and meetings.18  At the same time, agencies 
engaged in law enforcement, defense, and national security consider open government laws at 
best a burden and at worst a threat to their work.19  Moreover, the economic and administrative 
costs of complying with these laws is significantly greater than zero, and these costs may 
adversely affect the ability of all federal, state, and local agencies to make effective decisions in 
a rational, deliberative, and efficient manner.20  One could dismiss these competing concerns as 
complaints about the unavoidable costs and inefficiencies of democracy and the inevitable limits 
required to maintain a secure nation and functional government.  But, to return to the widespread 
recognition of its status as a preeminent political norm, if transparency is so magical and 
beneficial, why do we settle for less than its perfection?  Why must we worry about its costs?   
 
                                                 
16  With respect to matters of national security and foreign policy, for example, most challenges to agency 
denials to disclose documents end at the summary judgment stage, when courts typically defer to agency affidavits 
stating the applicability of FOIA exemption (b)(1).  See 1 JAMES T. O'REILLY, FEDERAL INFORMATION DISCLOSURE 
§  11:11, at 524 (3d ed. 2000) (discussing 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)).  And as a political matter, disappointment among 
disclosure advocates about the disjunction between the public statements of presidents in favor of openness and their 
actual efforts to keep information secret dates back to the earliest years of FOIA.  See Elias Clark, Holding 
Government Accountable: The Amended Freedom of Information Act, 41 YALE L.J. 741, 746 (1975) (describing the 
contradictory words and actions of Presidents Johnson and Nixon, the first Executives following FOIA’s 
enactment). 
17  See REPORTERS’ COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, HOMEFRONT CONFIDENTIAL: HOW THE WAR ON 
TERRORISM AFFECTS ACCESS TO INFORMATION AND THE PUBLIC’S RIGHT TO KNOW 60-77 (5th ed., 2004) (describing 
the increasing resistance of federal agencies to respond to FOIA requests following September 11, 2001); Michele 
Bush Kimball, Law Enforcement Records Custodians’ Decision-Making Behaviors in Response to Florida’s Public 
Records Law, 8 COMM. L. & POL’Y 313, 314-16 (2003) (describing widespread noncompliance by state and local 
government agencies to state disclosure laws); The Freedom of Information Center at the Missouri School of 
Journalism, Audits and Surveys of State Freedom of Information Laws, available at 
http://foi.missouri.edu/openrecseries/index.html (Feb. 20, 2005) (summarizing audits of state and local government 
responses to requests made under state freedom of information laws that show variable, but largely imperfect, 
compliance). 
18  See Andy Alford, It’s the Law: Texans Can’t Be Kept in the Dark, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, March 13, 
2005, at A1.  
19  See, e.g., Center for Nat’l Sec. Stud. v. DOJ, 331 F.3d 918, 922-23 (D.C. Cir. 2003), cert. denied 540 U.S. 
1104  (2004) (describing affidavits filed by the Justice Department and FBI officials noting asserting that disclosure 
of information on identities of detainees held following September 11 would harm ongoing law enforcement efforts 
and national security). 
20  See infra Part I.B.2. 
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The problem posed by these questions, and the frustrations with open government laws 
that the questions represent, originate in the concept of “transparency” itself.  As the core of a 
normative and instrumentalist project to achieve open government, the concept fails to consider 
the tensions it conceals.  It assumes too much of the state, of government information, and of the 
public, and as a result fails to produce or helpfully inform an effective, mutually acceptable level 
of administrative openness.  The easy embrace of transparency as a basis for normative and 
instrumental ends evades more difficult questions:  When is transparency most important as an 
administrative norm? To what extent should an agency be held to that norm?  These challenging 
but necessary questions typically lead transparency proponents and open government laws to 
concede a set of exceptions to disclosure that are just as broad and, ironically, just as opaque as 
the transparency norms themselves.  Thus, where disclosure requirements threaten to reveal 
information regarding national security, national defense, and law enforcement investigations, 
the positive norms of transparency must give way to state claims for the need to hoard 
information for the public safety and good.  These exceptions in turn unravel the ideal of 
transparency by vesting broad discretion about whether and how much to disclose in the very 
state actors that have claimed the exceptions in the first place.21 
 
The result is a ritualistic struggle over openness and privilege, with grave consequences.  
An overly broad conception of transparency with similarly broad exceptions too often leads to 
excessive openness requirements placed upon some levels of government and administrative 
decisions, and too rarely leads to effective means to require openness when the state makes its 
most important, irreversible commitments to a particular policy.  Furthermore, a legislative or 
constitutional commitment to transparency does not magically lead to the informed, deliberative, 
and/or participatory public that advocates claim will arise when the state finally disgorges its 
secrets.  “Transparency,” used in its strongest and most abstract form in the context of open 
government, acts as a term of concealment and opacity that promises more than it can deliver, 
and that fails ultimately to further its stated end of a better, more responsive, and truly 
democratic government.  Rather than abstract normative claims and rhetoric, what is needed is 
some realism about transparency’s costs and benefits for the public, for governance, and for the 
relationship between the public and government. 
 
Abandoning transparency in its broadest conceptual form does not, however, require 
abandoning a commitment to open government and democracy.  Rather, recognizing 
transparency’s limits forces us to recognize the practical limits of imposing open government 
requirements on a bureaucratic state to which we delegate significant authority and of which we 
have high expectations.  As a general matter, any effort to regulate disclosure must clearly and, 
as much as possible, precisely account for both the relative costs and benefits of openness.  What 
kinds of governmental decisions and political participation are most likely to benefit from 
transparency?  What kinds of costs and dangers will government officials and institutions face as 
a result of meeting transparency requirements?  The implications of such an accounting for 
transparency rules have not been sufficiently considered; instead, transparency advocates and 
skeptics talk past each other within the stale, abstract discourse of transparency theory, in which 
each normative and consequential claim faces an equally valid counter-claim.   
                                                 
21  See SISSELA BOK, SECRETS 115 (1983). 
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This Article seeks to begin asking the questions above by rethinking transparency as a 
concept.  It begins with a survey of the literature on transparency’s meaning as a component of 
political theory, law, and policy.  Part I summarizes the arguments in favor of and against strong 
forms of transparency imposed on government entities, and describes the conceptions of 
transparency’s necessity and limits that are built into democratic theory.  I characterize the 
ground shared by these arguments as comprising a “transparency theory” that provides an 
underlying justification and framework for open government laws.  Part II explains transparency 
theory and the balance it attempts to strike between the thrust of disclosure requirements and the 
parry of governmental privilege claims.  Part III critiques that balance by identifying, 
explicating, and demystifying the simplistic model of linear communication that itself underlies 
contemporary transparency theory.  It argues that transparency theory fails to comprehend the 
complexities of bureaucracy, communication, and the public, and that, as a result, disclosure 
laws exclusively focus on the processes of information production and the types of information 
produced.  Part IV suggests an alternative approach to open government laws that would allow a 
more flexible, sensitive means to evaluate the costs and benefits of information disclosure.  It 
also proposes institutional alternatives to the current default regime in open government laws, 
which relies on weak judicial enforcement of disclosure mandates.  Finally, I offer substantive 
suggestions that would improve efforts to establish a more accountable state and informed 
public. 
 
I.  “TRANSPARENCY” 
The arguments in favor of transparency seem fairly obvious and commonsensical, at least 
in part because an informed citizenry and an open, accessible government are essential elements 
of liberal democratic theory and more consistent with modern Western political values than the 
alternative of secret government and an ignorant public.22  As a general matter, proponents make 
two claims on behalf of transparency: first, a government that is more transparent is therefore 
more democratic; and, second, a government that is more transparent will operate in a more 
effective and efficient manner, and will thereby better serve its citizens while dealing more fairly 
and peaceably with other nations.  In this Part, I first summarize these sets of claims, and then 
present some of the most trenchant criticisms of them.  Critics argue that strong forms of 
transparency requirements are neither essential nor beneficial to a democratic republic, which in 
its constitutional structure can correct any governmental abuses—either internally through 
checks and balances or externally through elections—without the dangers and inefficiencies that 
excessive openness creates.  
 
A. Transparency’s Benefits 
1.   Democratic Benefits 
Contemporary transparency advocates typically draw connections between their efforts 
and the beginnings of modern liberal democratic theory in order to make the argument that open 
government is an essential element of a functional liberal democracy.  James Madison’s 
statement in an 1821 letter that “[a] popular Government without popular information, or the 
                                                 
22  See EDWARD SHILS, THE TORMENT OF SECRECY 23-24 (1956). 
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means of acquiring it, is but a prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or perhaps both,”23 serves as the 
quote most often used by authors to demonstrate the foundational nature of transparency in 
modern democratic theory and in the American constitutional scheme.24  But one can find 
similar, if not quite as pithy and compelling, sentiments in the classical liberalism of Locke,25 
Mill,26 and Rousseau,27 in both Benthamite utilitarian philosophy28 and Kantian moral 
philosophy,29 as well as in the statements of other framers of the American constitution30—even 
if the framers’ own deliberations over the constitution were rather less than fully transparent.31  
Bentham, for example, argued that publicity enables closer relations between the state and its 
public by securing the confidence of the governed in the legislature, by facilitating 
communication between the state and the public, and by creating a more informed electorate.32  
If fully knowledgeable of the workings of government, the public can play its proper roles as 
                                                 
23  Letter from James Madison to W.T. Barry, Aug. 4, 1822, THE COMPLETE MADISON 337, 337 (Saul 
Padover, ed., 1953) (“A people who mean to be their own governors must arm themselves with the power that 
knowledge gives.  A popular government without popular information or the means of acquiring it is but a prologue 
to a farce or a tragedy or perhaps both.” ).  
24  A recent Westlaw search for the quotation in the “Journals and Law Reviews” database found 201 full 
quotations, almost entirely within articles asserting the need for open government.  See, e.g., Jonathan Turley, 
Presidential Papers and Popular Government: The Convergence of Constitutional and Property Theory in Claims 
of Ownership and Control of Presidential Records, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 651 (2003) (using quote in opening 
sentence to support argument that presidential papers should be seen as inherently public property); Senator Paul 
Wellstone, Growing Media Consolidation Must Be Examined to Preserve Our Democracy, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 551, 
551-52 (2000) (using quote in second paragraph of brief article warning of anti-democratic possibilities of media 
consolidation).  Such use extends backwards to criticisms of secrecy in the Reagan and Nixon eras.  See STEVEN L. 
KATZ, GOVERNMENT SECRECY: DECISIONS WITHOUT DEMOCRACY 2 (1987); MORTON H. HALPERIN & DANIEL N. 
HOFFMAN, TOP SECRET: NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE RIGHT TO KNOW 106 (1977). 
 But these uses of Madison’s homily to support transparency may obscure the quotation’s origins.  
According to one recent account, Madison intended the oft-cited sentences as part of an effort to support 
education—the “popular knowledge” of the quotation serving as an exhortation to a Kentucky professor seeking 
support for public school funding—rather than to support disclosure of government information, as has been 
supposed throughout the past fifty years.  See Michael Doyle, Misquoting Madison, LEGAL AFFAIRS, July/Aug. 
2002. 
25  See AJUME H. WINGO, VEIL POLITICS IN LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC STATES 16-18 (2003) (discussing the 
importance of transparency in Locke’s First Treatise of Government). 
26  See JOHN STUART MILL, Considerations of Representative Democracy, in UTILITARIANISM, ON LIBERTY 
AND CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 262 (H.B. Action ed., 1972) (1861). 
27  See JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, Dedication to the Republic of Geneva, in DISCOURSE ON THE ORIGIN OF 
INEQUALITY 32-33 (G.D.H. Cole trans., 1988). 
28  See JEREMY BENTHAM, POLITICAL TACTICS 29-44 (Michael James et al. eds., 1999). 
29  See Immanuel Kant, Eternal Peace, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF KANT 470 (Carl J. Friedrich ed., 1949). 
30  See Morris D. Forkosch, Freedom of Information in the United States, 20 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 38-46 (1972); 
David Mitchell Ivester, Note, The Constitutional Right to Know, 4 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 109, 120-34 (1977).  
Nevertheless, the framers neither intended nor considered the First Amendment to prohibit government secrecy or to 
create a constitutional right to information access.  See Timothy B. Dyk, Newsgathering, Press Access, and the First 
Amendment, 44 STAN. L. REV. 927, 933 (1992); Wallace Parks, The Open Government Principle: Applying the Right 
to Know Under the Constitution, 26 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 10 (1957). 
31  See J.R. Poole, Introduction, in THE FEDERALIST AND ANTIFEDERALIST PAPERS 18 (J.R. Poole ed., 1987); 
see also Jon Elster, Arguing and Bargaining in Two Constituent Assemblies, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 345, 410-12 
(2000) (arguing that the closed constitutional convention in the American colonies provided distinct advantages for 
the constitutional framing). 
32  See BENTHAM, supra note 28, at 29-34. 
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enlightened tribunal and collective decisionmakers whose “national intelligence,” trust, and 
attention lend “confidence and security” to “open and free policy.”33   
 
Following these principles, contemporary political theorists place the publicity of 
government laws and actions at the core of democracy because it enables both the rational choice 
of the individual citizen and the full flowering of informed public debate by the collective.  
Liberal philosophers who assume a contractual relationship between government and its citizens 
presume that openness enables individuals to grant their informed consent to be governed.  The 
Rawlsian original position, for example, identifies publicity as a necessary condition for the 
creation of a just society because it allows individuals to choose, in a rational and knowledgeable 
manner, the principles for a society with which they would agree to associate.34  Indeed, formal 
notions of the rule of law, whether they emphasize a Rawlsian just state or a Hayekian 
minimalist one,35 require self-enacting, publicly accessible, comprehensible legislation that limits 
and confines all exercise of public authority, and that facilitates the private ordering of individual 
behavior as a result.36  Only to the extent that these laws gain the consent of the governed—
which itself can only be freely given if the laws and their enforcement are public—will the 
political and administrative authorities that enact and enforce these laws be legitimate.37  
Proponents of deliberative democracy share the contractarians’ commitment to publicity, 
asserting that transparent reasoning and decisionmaking by a representative body enable public 
discussion and the broadening of citizens’ and officials’ moral and political perspectives.38  A 
deliberative understanding of the publicity principle requires that government give public 
justifications for its policies,39 and promote rational, critical public debate and unrestricted 
communication in order to promote a functional, democratic public sphere.40  In short, liberal 
democratic theory requires the state to give an account of itself to its public and to justify its 
actions to the individual and community.41 
 
                                                 
33  See BENTHAM, supra note 28, at 29-34. 
34  See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 16, 454 (1971). 
35  See FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 74-75 (1944); RAWLS, supra note 34, at 238.  William 
Sage has connected transparency as a concept with libertarian politics, arguing that transparency rhetoric operates as 
part of a “resurgent rhetoric of individualism and self-reliance in American politics, reflecting diminished 
expectations of government and heightened skepticism regarding public programs and public institutions,” despite 
widespread public distrust of the market and of concentrations of corporate power.  See William M. Sage, 
Regulating Through Information: Disclosure and American Health Care, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1701, 1707 (1999). 
36  See generally Robert G. Vaughn, Introduction, in FREEDOM OF INFORMATION at xv, xv-xvi (ed. Robert G. 
Vaughn, 2000) (discussing how approaches to administrative law that privilege the formal rule of law understand the 
need for open government). 
37  In this sense, the argument for transparency resembles arguments in favor of administrative reform that 
invoke a strict conception of the rule of law.  See generally Thomas O. Sargentich, The Reform of the American 
Administrative Process: The Contemporary Debate, 1984 WISC. L. REV. 385, 397-99 (summarizing rule of law ideal 
of the administrative process). 
38  See AMY GUTTMAN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT 100-01; Joshua Cohen, 
Democracy and Liberty, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 185, 193-94 (Jon Elster ed., 1998). 
39  GUTTMAN & THOMPSON, supra note 38, at 101. 
40  JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE 208-09 (trans. Thomas 
Burger, 1989). 
41  See JAMES G. MARCH & JOHAN P. OLSEN, DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE 146-48 (1995). 
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 Legislative and judicial efforts to curb government secrecy and protect informed 
individual choice, public debate, and state self-justification harness this liberal democratic 
conception of transparency’s benefits.  Consider, for example, the normative presumptions upon 
which Congress relied in passing the original Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) in 1966.  
The House of Representatives’ Report to the original legislation rested its conclusion about the 
necessity of a broader, more exacting public access law on the fact that “[a] democratic society 
requires an informed, intelligent electorate, and the intelligence of the electorate varies as the 
quantity and quality of its information varies.”42  Congress presumed that requiring government 
to make its information available to the public would in turn improve the quality of voter 
decisionmaking and, as a result, the quality of governance as representatives respond to a more 
“intelligent” electorate.  Similar statements regarding the broad democratic basis for open 
government laws accompanied passage of the two most important expansions of FOIA, those 
passed in response to Watergate in 197443 and the “Electronic FOIA” amendments of 1996.44    
 
Prevailing strains of liberal democratic political theory and open government legislation 
thus share the assumptions that the publicity of open government produces an informed and 
interested public, and, by implication, that secrecy caused by opaque or closed government 
produces suspicious and/ or ignorant masses.  Openness is a necessary condition of popular 
democratic power, a predicate for effective representative government, and an indispensable part 
of the everyday life of the free individual and of the wider demos.  Ultimately, transparency 
emerges within modern political theory and legislation as constitutive of the public and of the 
public sphere itself, creating legitimate government and then legitimating the actions of the 
government that it creates by enabling informed individual choice and collective, democratic 
decisionmaking.       
 
2.   Positive Consequences 
Transparency proponents also cite instrumental reasons for imposing disclosure 
requirements on government.45  These consequentialist arguments similarly trace back to the 
                                                 
42  H.R. Rep. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1966, reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2418, 2428.  The House 
and Senate Committee Reports differ in historically important ways because of different sets of political pressures 
placed on them during the time of the bill’s drafting and passage.  See Kenneth Culp Davis, The Information Act: A 
Preliminary Analysis, 34 U. CHICAGO L. REV. 761, 809-11 (1967); Note, The Freedom of Information Act: Access to 
Law, 36 FORDHAM L. REV. 765, 767 (1968).  I ignore these differences because my focus is instead on the larger 
conceptual presumptions that the reports share concerning the need and likely effects of transparency. 
43  Pub. L. No. 93-502, 88 Stat. 1561 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994)). 
44  Electronic Freedom of Information Act Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-231, 110 Stat. 3048 
(codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (Supp. II 1996)).  For a description of how these amendments changed agency 
obligations to make information available electronic and reduce delays in responding to FOIA requests, see Mark H. 
Grunewald, E-FOIA and the “Mother of All Complaints”: Information Delivery and Delay Reduction, 50 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 345 (1998).  
45  In this respect, the argument for transparency resembles arguments in favor of reforming administrative 
agencies to enable them better to achieve instrumental goals.  See generally Sargentich, supra note 37, at 410-15 
(describing “public purposes,” or instrumentalist, ideal of administrative process). 
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beginnings of modern liberal democratic theory.46  The most significant consequences flow from 
the public’s increased ability to monitor government activity and hold officials, particularly 
incompetent and corrupt ones, accountable for their actions.47  Additional information also 
enables individuals to make better decisions in their private lives and in their engagement in the 
market, resulting, for example, in changed consumer and industry behavior in fields as diverse as 
health and the environment.48  But transparency also has more subtle, though equally beneficial, 
consequences.  It enables the free flow of information among public agencies and private 
individuals, allowing input, review, and criticism of government action, and thereby increases 
the quality of governance.49  When individual agencies hoard information, they inhibit the ability 
of entities working in the same or related areas of operation to provide competing or 
collaborative work.50  For this reason, the late Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan argued, military 
and intelligence agencies failed to recognize growing evidence of the failing Soviet state, leading 
to massive but unnecessary Cold War military expenditures.51  Similarly and more recently, the 
9/11 Commission found that the failure of law enforcement and intelligence agencies to share 
information and communicate fully with the President led the security apparatus of the federal 
government to ignore evidence that may have foiled the terrorist attacks of September 11.52  
Military analysts have also argued that the highly structured classification apparatus, which 
depends upon formal definitions of classified information, formal procedures for giving 
clearance to individuals to view classified information, and technical and operational procedures 
for protecting classified information, conflicts with efforts to modernize military operations and 
intelligence analysis.53 
 
                                                 
46  See, e.g., JOHN STUART MILL, CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 34 (Gateway Editions, 
1962) (asserting that publicity is a constituent element of representative democracy by allowing citizens to check the 
bad behavior and decisions of their leaders and to encourage the good). 
47  See Common Cause v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 674 F.2d 921, 928 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (Skelley Wright, 
J.) (explaining that Congress’s intent in enacting the Sunshine Act requiring open agency meetings was to “enhance 
citizen confidence in government, encourage higher quality work by government officials, stimulate well-informed 
public debate about government programs and polices, and promote cooperation between citizens and government.  
In short, it sought to make government more fully accountable to the people.”); MARCH & OLSON, supra note 41, at 
162-65; SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION AND GOVERNMENT 162-65 (1999); Joseph E. Stiglitz, On Liberty, 
the Right to Know, and Public Discourse: The Role of Transparency in Public Life, Oxford Amnesty Lecture, 
Oxford, U.K. Jan. 27, 1999, at 13-15. 
48  See Cass R. Sunstein, Informing America: Risk, Disclosure, and the First Amendment, 20 FLA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 653, 662-65 (1993). 
49  SECRECY: REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON PROTECTING AND REDUCING GOVERNMENT SECRECY, 103rd 
Cong., Report Pursuant to Public Law, S. DOC. NO. 105-2, at xxi (Comm. Print 1997) [hereinafter MOYNIHAN 
COMMISSION REPORT]. 
50  See DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, SECRECY 73, 77-79, 142-43, 214 (1998). 
51  See id. at 154-201, 221-22. 
52  See NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 357-58 (W.W. 
Norton ed., 2004). 
53  See Bruce Berkowitz, Secrecy and Security, HOOVER DIGEST 11, available at 
http://www.hooverdigest.org/011/berkowitz.html (May 10, 2004); cf. Beth M. Kasper, The End of Secrecy? Military 
Competitiveness in the Age of Transparency, Occasional Paper no. 23, Center for Strategy and Technology, Air War 
College 38-39 (2001) (arguing that the U.S. military must speed its decision-making processes to account for both 
the increase in its own information gathering capabilities and the transparency of its operations to others). 
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An open government offers numerous additional advantages to a democratic nation, 
especially in its relations to the wider global community.54  Transparency enables stronger, more 
peaceful international relations by allowing for more accurate verification of nations’ compliance 
with international agreements and standards; national markets gain greater access to foreign 
investment through credible government oversight and more efficient regulation of market 
activity; and global environmental agreements are more effective and more effectively enforced 
through accessible information.55  With respect to the increasingly international, cooperative 
scientific community, government efforts to prevent cross-border sharing of scientific 
information reduces scientists’ autonomy from political and administrative forces and ultimately 
impedes their independent advancement of scientific knowledge.56   
 
The empirical, consequentialist claim for transparency views secrecy’s adverse effects on 
efficient and effective government as not only separate from but, for some, equal to normative 
claims on behalf of liberal democratic values.57  But these two propositions typically run 
together, on the assumption that an open democratic regime that enables informed individual 
choice not only provides means for citizens to monitor and to some extent participate in 
government decisions, but also enables an open society that encourages productive public and 
private investment, as well as good relationships with other nations.58  Ultimately, for its 
proponents, transparency produces an informed public and a responsive government, and, as a 
result, a functional society. 
 
B.  Transparency’s Limits 
But governmental transparency cannot be complete.  Bentham noted this,59 as do not only 
deliberative democrats (who have a particular interest in protecting the deliberation process from 
                                                 
54  Numerous multinational organizations and NGOs have focused on the larger global benefits to open 
government.  These include the OECD and UNESCO, see Information, Consultation and Public Participation in 
Policy-making: Building Open Government in OECD Member Countries, in ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-
OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, OPEN GOVERNMENT: FOSTERING DIALOGUE WITH CIVIL SOCIETY 7, 11, 15 (2003), 
and Transparency International and the Open Society Institute, see Transparency International, available at 
http://www.transparency.org; RIGA DECLARATION: TRANSPARENCY IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN EASTERN EUROPE 
(Local Government & Public Service Reform Initiative, 2000), available at 
http://lgi.osi.hu/publications/2000/23/RD.PDF 
55  See Ann Florini, The End of Secrecy, FOREIGN POLICY, Summer 1998. 
56  See SHILS, supra note 22, at 160-92; Secrecy and Knowledge Production, Cornell University Peace Studies 
Program Occasional Paper #23 (Judith Reppy ed., 1999), available at 
http://www.einaudi.cornell.edu/PeaceProgram/publications/occasional_papers/occasional-paper23.pdf; Benjamin S. 
DuVal, Jr., The Occasions of Secrecy, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 579, 606 (1986). 
57  Moynihan and Richard Gid Powers, who contributed an extended introduction to Moynihan’s monograph, 
largely reject normative concerns about disclosure as a necessary and direct good for democracy, in part because 
they have less confidence than many transparency advocates in the inherent possibilities of a participatory, informed 
public, and in part because they fear the political paranoia of the margins.  See MOYNIHAN, supra note 50, at 219-21; 
Richard Gid Powers, Introduction, in id. at 1, 17, 42-48. 
58  See, e.g., Stiglitz, supra note 47, at 26-27 (associating the instrumental and intrinsic benefits of transparent 
democracy). 
59  See BENTHAM, supra note 28, at 39 (enumerating instances when publicity should be suspended).  
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intrusive publicity),60 but transparency advocates themselves.61  Government cannot operate in a 
manner that provides complete access to all proceedings and documents.  Complete transparency 
not only would create prohibitive logistical problems and expenditures (given the number of 
documents and meetings that would need to be made available), but, more important, it would 
impede many of government’s most important operations and infringe on the privacy interests of 
individuals who give personal information to the government.62  Thus, skeptics of a strong form 
of transparency complain about the potential excesses of disclosure requirements while they 
question both the extent of the benefits that such requirements offer and the notion that absolute 
government openness is ideal.63  And if citizens are not necessarily interested in or capable of 
being informed by full disclosure of government operations,64 and if the empirical claims about 
transparency’s positive consequences remain unproven,65 then mandated disclosure may have 
minimal positive consequences and no democratic value at all.  Strong arguments in favor of 
transparency, in other words, face significant challenge from within democratic theory. 
 
1.  Transparency’s Constitutional Threat 
Transparency advocates work from the assumptions that a disclosure deficit naturally 
results from a constitutional system that lacks explicit commitments to openness, that this deficit 
represents a constitutional failing and a threat to democracy, and that some statutory or 
constitutional legal intervention is necessary to curb that threat and correct that failing.  To 
question these assumptions, as then-Professor Antonin Scalia did in an important 1982 article, is 
to challenge the notion that an apparent lack of explicit disclosure requirements represents a 
threat at all.  For Scalia, the tri-partite system of government created by the Constitution provides 
sufficient disclosure of government information.  The Constitution empowers Congress, within 
limits, to check Executive discretion and inquire into the President’s actions, while every 
election allows voters to inquire into and reject the political branches’ decisions.  Because 
institutionalized checks and balances of a constitutional representative democracy lead to a 
sufficient degree of government transparency, Scalia argued, the harms caused by any additional 
disclosure requirements overshadow whatever benefits these additional requirements might 
claim to offer.66 
                                                 
60  See, e.g., GUTTMAN & THOMPSON, supra note 38, at 103-26 (evaluating various possible exceptions to the 
norm of publicity). 
61  See, e.g., Stiglitz, supra note 47, at 18-25 (discussing legitimate, limited exceptions to transparency). 
62  See BOK, supra note 21, at 175-76; Robert L. Saloschin, The Department of Justice and the Explosion of 
Freedom of Information Act Litigation, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1401 (2000). 
63  See Antonin Scalia, The Freedom of Information Act Has No Clothes, REGULATION, March/April 1982, at 
14, 15. 
64  See DANIEL YANKELOVITCH, THE MAGIC OF DIALOGUE 24 (1999); infra Part III.C. 
65  See Neal D. Finkelstein, Introduction: Transparency in Public Policy, in TRANSPARENCY IN PUBLIC POLICY 
1, 1 (Neal D. Finkelstein ed., 2000) (questioning whether consequentialist claims have ever been proven, and 
asserting that they are likely unprovable, given the difficulty in testing whether any given policy is “transparent” and 
the extent to which such transparency has a causal effect on a subsequent government decision or public behavior). 
66  Scalia, supra note 63, at 15.  For Scalia, FOIA and similar efforts to force open government are an historic 
aberration, products of “the obsession that gave them birth—that the first line of defense against an arbitrary 
executive is do-it-yourself oversight by the public and its surrogate, the press.”  Id. at 19.  This obsession, he argues, 
is not merely romantic but empirically incorrect; instead, disclosure of government corruption and overreaching 
(including the Watergate break-in and examples of illegal CIA and FBI actions against American citizens) occurred 
 
-16- 
 
The most significant of such harms, at least at the level of creating systemic political 
danger, arises from Congress imposing, and the Judiciary enforcing, unconstitutional duties and 
demands on the Executive Branch through statutory disclosure requirements.  Transparency 
skeptics’ concerns about a vulnerable constitution represents the dark side of the theory that a 
strong, equipoised constitutional system produces sufficient information; it bubbles under 
common law constitutional doctrines that concern efforts by the Executive to avoid information 
disclosure.  Fears that transparency will threaten the constitution, for example, fuels the core 
logic behind the amorphous concept of executive privilege,67 the right of the President (and, 
perhaps, presidential advisers68) to resist disclosure of information.69  The Court in United States 
v. Nixon,70 reviewing President Nixon’s claims of executive privilege as a defense against the 
release of documents and tapes to the Special Prosecutor investigating the Watergate break-in 
and its cover-up, identified the constitutional nature of the confidentiality of presidential 
communications in the executive branch’s “supremacy . . . within its own assigned area of 
constitutional duties.”71  To threaten disclosure of certain types of information, then, imperils not 
only the President’s autonomy, it also upsets the careful balance created by the separate 
autonomies of American constitutional government.  Justice Harlan, in his dissent in the 
Pentagon Papers case, provided the strongest judicial statement of this argument.  The Court’s 
refusal to grant an injunction that would restrain the press from publishing materials whose 
disclosure the President claimed would harm military operations, Harlan argued, established new 
and troubling judicial authority to review presidential claims of the threats disclosures would 
cause, and thereby increased the Judiciary’s power at the expense of the Executive.72   
 
Concerns regarding transparency’s adverse effects to a vulnerable constitutional structure 
arise even outside the heady realms of national security and presidential invocations of executive 
privilege.  Consider, for example, the heretofore unsuccessful constitutional challenges to the 
Federal Advisory Committee Act (“FACA”).73  Enacted in the same post-Watergate era as FOIA 
                                                                                                                                                             
because of the internal dynamics of the American constitutional system.  This assertion is largely false; although 
none of the instances of disclosure he mentions were initially made public through the FOIA, they were the products 
of investigative journalism, political activism, and agency error in releasing classified or otherwise secret 
information rather than the result of any natural “checks and balances” of internal government structures.  See 
KATHRYN S. OLMSTED, CHALLENGING THE SECRET GOVERNMENT: THE POST-WATERGATE INVESTIGATIONS OF THE 
CIA AND FBI 11-39 (1996).  These disclosures resulted from intervention into and disruption of antidemocratic acts 
of governmental secrecy that sought to hide information about the progress of the war in Southeast Asia and about 
potentially illegal acts taken by those within the Executive Branch or with ties to the President.   
67  See Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, A Critical Comment on the Constitutionality of Executive Privilege, 83 
MINN. L. REV. 1143, 1188 (1999) (“[T]here are as many versions of executive privilege as there are proponents and . 
. . each version of executive privilege seems to approximate exactly what the particular [proponent] deems 
appropriate and no more.”). 
68  See In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729, 549-50 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (holding that executive privilege may extend 
to the communications of presidential advisers even when the President takes no part in the communications). 
69  See Mark J. Rozell, Executive Privilege and the Modern Presidents: In Nixon’s Shadow, 83 MINN. L. REV. 
1069, 1069 (1999). 
70  418 U.S. 683 (1974). 
71  Id. at 705-06. 
72  New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 756-57 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
73  Pub. L. No. 92-463, 86 Stat. 770 (1972) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. App. II SS 1-15). 
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and the Government in the Sunshine Act,74 FACA requires, among other things, that an advisory 
committee, task force, or similar group established within the Executive Branch and including at 
least one member who is not a federal employee or officer hold open meetings and make its 
records available within a framework similar to that established by FOIA.75  Congress intended 
FACA in part to enable public scrutiny of what it deemed an increasingly powerful advisory 
committee process within the Executive Branch that had been captured by industry interests.76  
But in passing FOIA, Congress also mandated substantive requirements and procedures that 
regulate the President’s and executive officers’ ability to seek advice from the public.  While 
majorities of the Supreme Court and D.C. Circuit have avoided the separation of powers issues 
FACA creates in Public Citizen v. U.S. Department of Justice77 and Association of American 
Physicians and Surgeons v. Clinton78 (by holding that FACA applied to neither the ABA 
Standing Committee on the Federal Judiciary nor President Clinton’s Task Force on National 
Health Care Reform respectively), minority opinions in both cases argued that FACA is 
unconstitutional on the grounds that it infringed upon the President’s freedom “to investigate, to 
be informed, to evaluate, and to consult” while performing his constitutional duties.79   
 
2. Transparency’s Negative Consequences 
In addition to these more abstract constitutional concerns, critics also challenge what they 
consider to be the enormous unintended consequences of disclosure requirements.80  First and 
foremost, they argue, forced disclosure creates a nation that is more susceptible to security 
breaches and less able to enforce its owns laws because evil-doers will have greater access to 
information that could be used to threaten the health and safety of the public.81  Congress has 
responded to such concerns by exempting military, national security, and law enforcement 
                                                 
74  See Steven P. Croley & William F. Funk, The Federal Advisory Committee Act and Good Government, 14 
YALE J. ON REG. 458-65 (1997) 
75  5 U.S.C. app. §§  3, 9, 10. 
76  See Croley & Funk, supra note 74, at 464-65. 
77  491 U.S. 440 (1989). 
78  997 F.2d 898 (D.C. Cir. 1993). 
79  Public Citizen, 491 U.S. at 482-88 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also Association of American Physicians, 
998 F.2d at 924-25.  More recent decisions surrounding Vice President Cheney’s National Energy Policy 
Development Group have not reached the constitutional issues surround FACA—at least yet.  See Walker v. 
Cheney, 230 F.Supp. 2d 51, 75 (2002) (dismissing GAO suit under FACA for lack of standing without reaching 
FACA’s constitutionality); Judicial Watch v. National Energy Policy Development Group, 219 F. Supp. 2d 20, 50-
55 (D.D.C. 2002) (finding cause of action in mandamus to enforce FACA, and refusing to reach constitutional issue 
until after discovery); appeal dismissed sub nom. In re Cheney, 334 F.3d 1096 (D.C. Cir. 2003); rev’d sub nom. 
Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 124 S.Ct. 2576 (2004) (reversing circuit court’s denial of mandamus petition without 
reaching constitutionality of FACA) .  On the issue of FACA’s constitutionality, see generally Jay S. Bybee, 
Advising the President: Separation of Powers and the Federal Advisory Committee Act, 104 YALE L.J. 51 (1994) 
(arguing against FACA’s constitutionality); Croley & Funk, supra note 74, at 468-71 (summarizing separation of 
powers challenges and executive privilege issues to FACA); Carolyn Bingham Kello, Note, Drawing the Curtain on 
Open Government? In Defense of the Federal Advisory Committee Act,  69 BROOKLYN L.REV. 345 (2003) (arguing 
in favor of FACA’s constitutionality).   
80  See Scalia, supra note 63, at 15 (calling FOIA “the Taj Mahal of the Doctrine of Unanticipated 
Consequences, the Sistine Chapel of Cost-Benefit Analysis Ignored”). 
81  Two post-September 11 expressions of this position are Anderson, supra note 12, and Laura A. White, The 
Need for Governmental Secrecy: Why the U.S. Government Must Be Able to Withhold Information in the Interest of 
National Security, 43 VA. J. INT’L L. 1071 (2003). 
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operations from disclosure in its exemptions to FOIA,82 and the federal judiciary has largely 
adopted this preference when it evaluates challenges to the President’s and executive branch 
agencies’ unwillingness to disclose allegedly exempted documents.83   
 
The events of September 11 seem to have reinforced the dynamics of judicial review.  
Writing for a two judge majority in the D.C. Circuit’s 2003 decision holding that the names of 
persons detained following the September 11, 2001 attacks and the details of their detainment 
fell within FOIA’s law enforcement exception,84 Judge Sentelle referred to and followed what he 
described as a long tradition of judicial deference to the Justice Department in FOIA cases that 
raise national security issues.  Because terrorism presents America with an enemy “just as real as 
its former Cold War foes, with capabilities beyond the capacity of the judiciary to explore,” 
Judge Sentelle wrote, a court cannot second-guess executive judgments about the adverse effects 
that any disclosure would have to ongoing law enforcement proceedings related to the war on 
terrorism.85  To do so would leave the nation vulnerable to attack. 
 
Such are the potentially grave risks of transparency; disclosure requirements also 
undeniably raise the fiscal costs of open government.86  Agency efforts to comply with FOIA are 
expensive.87  In addition to the direct costs of responding to FOIA requests, judicial oversight of 
agency request denials—made worse by brief deadlines imposed on agencies and expedited, de 
                                                 
82  See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1), (7). 
83  See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710-11 (1974) (quoting United States v. Reynolds, 345 
U.S. 1, 10 (1953) (when “there is a reasonable danger that compulsion of the evidence will expose military matters 
which, in the interest of national security, should not be divulged,” a court should recognize that the protections 
provided by executive privilege require the Judiciary to refrain from second-guessing the President); O’REILLY,  
supra note 16, at § 11.26 (“[d]eference is great when the agency asserts that a serious harm would result from 
disclosure” of documents that allegedly contain national security information). 
84  See Center for Nat’l Sec. Stud. v. DOJ, 331 F.3d 918 (D.C. Cir. 2003), cert. denied 540 U.S. 1104 (2004).   
85  Id. at 928, 932. 
86  And not just for government.  Transparency requirements may hamper some non-governmental operations 
as well.  Scientists and researchers employed or funded by the government, for example, could be forced to disclose 
data at an early stage of their government-sponsored studies, leading to premature use or criticism of their work.  See 
DuVal, supra note 56 at 621-25; cf. Lars Noah, Scientific “Republicanism”: Expert Peer Review and the Quest for 
Regulatory Deliberation, 49 EMORY L.J. 1033, 1065-66 (2000) (arguing against disclosure of the working 
documents of regulatory peer review panels).  The trade secrets and commercial or financial information of private 
firms contracting with the government could be vulnerable to competitors, thereby leading firms to withdraw from 
governmental operations and harm the public as well.  See Critical Mass Energy Project v. NRC, 975 F.2d 871, 874 
(D.C. Cir. 1992); WILLIAM L. CASEY ET AL., ENTREPRENEURSHIP, PRODUCTIVITY AND THE FREEDOM OF 
INFORMATION ACT (1983).  An exemption from FOIA requirements covers “matters that are trade secrets . . . 
obtained from a person and privileged or confidential.”  5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4). 
87  In Fiscal Year 2002, the total cost of all FOIA-related activities for all federal departments and agencies, as 
reported in their annual FOIA reports, was over $300 million.  See Office of Information and Privacy, Summary of 
Annual FOIA Reports for Fiscal Year 2002, at http://www.usdoj.gov/oip/foiapost/2003foiapost31.htm.  See 
generally Charles J. Wichmann III, Note, Ridding FOIA of Those “Unanticipated Consequences”: Repaving a 
Necessary Road to Freedom 47 DUKE L.J. 1213, 1219-21 (1998) (tracking the enormous increase in FOIA 
compliance costs following 1974 amendments). 
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novo judicial review—drain limited judicial resources.88  State courts and state and local 
agencies, subject to or empowered with enforcement of analogous state open government laws, 
face similar administrative and adjudicatory costs at the state level but without the resources and 
taxing authority enjoyed by the federal government.  The breadth of public disclosure 
requirements increases these costs.  Anyone can request information under FOIA’s expansive 
mandate that agencies make all records that are not otherwise excepted available to “any 
person,”89 for example, no matter the reason.  Frequent FOIA requesters include businesses that 
seek the records of competitors for commercial motivations, individuals seeking personal and 
family records from the Social Security Administration for genealogical research, or litigants 
attempting to circumvent discovery rules in suits against the government.90   
 
Thus transparency appears costly and overbroad; it also harms government 
decisionmaking by adversely affecting the ability of government officials to deliberate over 
policy matters outside of the public eye, and by curbing or skewing the production of 
informational goods.  Disclosure of documents prepared by government officials may inhibit a 
president and agency decisionmakers from receiving candid, objective, and knowledgeable 
advice from subordinates.91  Closed deliberations enable policymakers to make more thoughtful 
consideration of the available information and the relative advantages of alternatives, to engage 
in more fulsome and substantive debate over the most popular and unpopular alternatives 
regarding even the most passionate public issues, and to bargain openly in order to reach a 
widely acceptable and optimal result, without the inevitable pressure that accompanies public 
scrutiny.92  Anecdotal complaints about open meeting laws suggest that agencies subject to them 
hold fewer meetings, engage in a constrained, less informed dialogue when they meet, are 
vulnerable to greater domination by those who possess greater communications skills and self-
                                                 
88  See Savage v. CIA, 826 F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1987) (complaining that judicial consideration of “petty” FOIA 
requests is a monumental waste of judicial resources); Abner Mikva, Knowing You, Knowing Me, LEGAL TIMES, 
Jan. 6, 1997, at 23 (describing administrative burden of FOIA enforcement on federal district courts).  
89  5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A). 
90  See Amy E. Rees, Recent Developments Regarding the Freedom of Information Act: A "Prologue to a 
Farce or a Tragedy; or, Perhaps Both," 44 DUKE L.J. 1183, 1184 (1995); Chuck McCutcheon,  Demand for Public 
Information is Surging, Newhouse News Service, March 7, 2005, available at 
http://www.newhouse.com/archive/mccutcheon030805.html. 
91  See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729, 750 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (“If presidential advisers must assume they 
will be held to account publicly for all approaches that were advanced, considered but ultimately rejected, they will 
almost inevitably be inclined to avoid serious consideration of novel or controversial approaches to presidential 
problems.”). 
92  See BOK, supra note 21, at 175-76; DAVID M. WELBORN ET AL., IMPLEMENTATION AND EFFECTS OF THE 
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IN THE SUNSHINE ACT IN 1984 RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS 235-39 (Administrative 
Conference of the United States: Background Report for Recommendation 84-3); Michael A. Lawrence, Finding 
Shade from the “Government in the Sunshine Act”: A Proposal to Permit Private Informal Background Discussions 
at the United States International Commission, 45 CATH. U. L. REV. 1, 10-12 (1995);Vermeule, supra note 9, at 
412-13.  Courts often affirm this belief, perhaps based on their own practice of closed deliberations and conferences.  
See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705 (1974) (“Human experience teaches that those who expect 
public dissemination of their remarks may well temper candor with a concern for appearances and for their own 
interests to the detriment of the decisionmaking process.”). 
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confidence no matter the quality of their ideas, and lose the potential for informal, creative 
debate that chance or planned meetings outside of the public eye enable.93   
 
In this sense, laws protecting against the disclosure of government information offer a 
second-best alternative to protecting against the unauthorized circulation of information in the 
absence of property rights protection for public intellectual products.94  Ostensibly, when 
transparency is limited, concealment helps to produce higher quality decisions based upon more 
valuable information.95  As disclosure requirements become more rigorous, then, the quantity 
and quality of information available to and considered by decision-makers shrinks.  Thus, public 
officers and agencies need some privilege to keep information secret, at least temporarily, in 
order to perform their jobs properly.  And, more broadly, transparency must be limited in order 
to allow a functioning democracy. 
 
II.  TRANSPARENCY’S BALANCE 
Considered together, the democratic and consequentialist arguments in favor of and 
against strong-form transparency share certain assumptions.  They each assume an opposition 
between the public state and its private citizenry, and that for democracy to function, this 
opposition must be managed and, where possible, dissolved.  They also agree that in its acts of 
                                                 
93  See Nicholas Johnson, Open Meetings and Closed Minds: Another Road to the Mountaintop, 53 DRAKE L. 
REV. 11, 22-24 (2004); Joseph W. Little & Thomas Tompkins, Open Government Laws: An Insider’s View, 53 N.C. 
L. REV. 451, 452 (1975); Randolph J. May, Taking the Sunshine Act: Too Much Exposure Inhibits Collegial 
Decision Making, LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 5, 1996, at 24;  Kathy Bradley, Note, Do You Feel the Sunshine? Government 
in the Sunshine Act: Its Objectives, Goals, and Effect on the FCC and You, 49 FED. COMM. L.J. 473, 481-85 (1997). 
94  Government claims that some information must remain secret, in other words, are efforts to use a 
secondary method to protect against information becoming an easily circulated and appropriable public good 
through disclosure.  On the relationship between secrecy and the “public domain” status of government-produced 
information, see Edward Lee, The Public’s Domain: The Evolution of Legal Restraints on the Government’s Power 
to Control Public Access Through Secrecy and Intellectual Property, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 91, 123-38 (2003).  Cf. 
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 242 (1981) (noting that two methods for protecting information 
are by creating property rights in information and by secrecy).   
95  This consequentialist assumption parallels that in intellectual property law regarding the benefits of 
property rights protection for the production of intellectual goods.  Consider, for example, the conflicts over the 
availability of presidential papers.  Former presidents typically want property rights over their presidential materials 
in order to control access to them and shape their historical record, but, following the Presidential Records Act of 
1978, can no longer do so.  See Presidential Records Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-591, § 2, 92 Stat. 2523, 2534 
(codified as amended at 44 U.S.C. § 2202 (2000)) (providing that “[t]he United States shall reserve and retain 
complete ownership, possession, and control of Presidential records”).  On the history of the PRA, see Carl 
Bretscher, The President and Judicial Review Under the Records Act, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1477 (1992); Carl 
McGowan, Presidents and Their Papers, 68 MINN. L. REV. 409, 416 (1983).  In response and in order to provide 
greater control by the current and former presidents over historical materials, President George W. Bush, by 
executive order, has granted the incumbent and former President veto power over access to presidential records.  See 
Exec. Order No. 13,233, 66 Fed. Reg. 56,025 (Nov. 1, 2001), at § 3(d)(1)(ii); Jonathan Turley, Presidential Papers 
and Popular Government: The Convergence of Constitutional and Property Theory in Claims of Ownership and 
Control of Presidential Records, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 651 (2003); Marcy Lynn Karin, Note, Out of Sight, but Not of 
Mind: How Executive Order 13,233 Expands Executive Privilege While Simultaneously Preventing Access to 
Presidential Records, 55 STAN. L. REV. 529 (2002);  Stephen H. Yuhan, Note, The Imperial Presidency Strikes 
Back: Executive Order 13,233, The National Archives, and the Capture of Presidential History, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1570 (2004). 
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governing, the state produces information, whether in the form of written texts (e.g., records) or 
practices (e.g., meetings), that exposes and explains its actions; that government would by 
default keep at least some significant portion of that information from the public; and that 
government can control access to its information.  For proponents of strong-form transparency, 
these assumptions constitute a problem that disclosure law and policy must solve; for 
transparency skeptics (or weak-form transparency advocates), these assumptions constitute a 
system of government and a set of norms and practices that any disclosure law or policy must 
protect.  Put another way, proponents and skeptics disagree about the normative and practical 
effects of disclosure requirements—effects that they feel certain would occur—but they agree 
both that transparency is better than its opposite in the abstract, and that they can derive and 
impose the measure of transparency that democracy requires.  Together, they constitute a general 
approach that I will call “transparency theory,” which itself includes both stronger and weaker 
forms that advocate for requiring variable degrees of disclosure upon government entities. 
 
In the abstract terms of its debate, transparency theory allows legislative, regulatory, and 
judicial efforts to impose some level of transparency in constitutional doctrines, statutes, and 
regulation that at least appear to reconcile the concerns raised by transparency advocates and 
skeptics.96  The reconciliation operates as a balancing test.  The constitutional doctrine of 
executive privilege, for example, offers a core of protection for the President and his advisers, 
but its application requires courts to balance competing concerns, such as “the fair administration 
of criminal justice” and the need of defendants facing criminal prosecution for information that 
might be eligible for privilege,97 and the public benefits of preserving the former presidents’ 
archival materials for legitimate historical and government purposes.98  Statutory disclosure 
requirements proceed in similar, though somewhat more precise, fashion.  In crafting FOIA, for 
example, Congress attempted to achieve a similar balance in recognizing that while it attempted 
to legislate a “general” or “broad” philosophy of openness, it must nevertheless respect “certain 
equally important rights” and “opposing interests” which are difficult but “not . . . impossible” to 
balance.99  “Success lies,” the Senate Report to FOIA concluded, “in providing a workable 
formula which encompasses, balances, and protects all interests, yet places emphasis on the 
fullest responsible disclosure.”100  Congress endorsed the empirical and normative presumptions 
of transparency advocates that openness is a prerequisite to a functional model of democracy 
                                                 
96  Such competing, apparently oppositional approaches arise throughout theories of government, and 
administrative law must inevitably operate within and resolve these contradictory claims.  See Sargentich, supra, 
note 37, at 392-97 (identifying the “rule of law,” “public purposes,” and “democratic process” as core conflicting 
ideals of administrative process); cf. Gerald E. Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 HARV. L. 
REV. 1276 (1984) (critiquing the self-contradictory conceptual models that undergird public and private bureaucratic 
orders).  As one prominent administrative law casebook cleverly demonstrates, the matched pairs of administrative 
law canons seem infinite and proceed in a Llewellynesque thrust and parry formation.  See JERRY L. MASHAW ET 
AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: THE AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW SYSTEM 30-32 (5th ed. 2003) (applying Karl Llewellyn, 
Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to be Construed, 3 
VAND. L.REV. 395 (1950), to the similarly paired critiques of administrative structure, authority, procedure, and 
actions). 
97  United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 711-12 (1974). 
98  Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 452-53 (1977). 
99  EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 80 n.6 (1973) (quoting S. Rep. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 5 (1965)). 
100  Id. 
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even as it limited disclosure requirements in practice because of similarly broad presumptions of 
countervailing interests.  It achieved these limits most explicitly in a series of enumerated 
exemptions to disclosure requirements,101 versions of which are part of state open records and 
meetings acts.102     
 
This dual doctrinal movement—at once surging towards disclosure and then receding 
back towards privilege—hearkens directly back to the irresolvable conflict between transparency 
advocates and their critics, both of whom offer powerful justifications for rigorous disclosure 
requirements and vigorous Executive Branch protections.  The balance struck between these dual 
movements offers both sufficient stability to provide a sense of continuity in public rights and 
government practices and sufficient flexibility to allow somewhat diverse approaches over 
successive presidential administrations and historical periods.   
 
Given the trans-historical, abstract nature of transparency theory, in other words, it 
should not surprise us that the balance embedded in disclosure laws responds to historical 
circumstances, and that one set of arguments or the other will have greater purchase at any 
particular moment.103  At such times, the political party or politician whose position appears 
relatively out of favor in a current balance will complain that the balance has failed to hold or 
represents a poor means to meet the normative and consequential ends it favors.104  Viewed in 
this light, complaints that shift between partisans demonstrate both the necessity and success of 
the balance struck in information disclosure laws.  Consider the typical scenario in which a 
former minority party gains control of an apparatus of government and engenders from the new 
minority opposition precisely the same complaints that the new majority had previously voiced 
about government secrecy when it was out of power.105  When this shift occurs, we could 
                                                 
101  5 U.S.C. (b)(1)-(7). 
102  See, e.g., Fla. Const. Art. I, sec. 24(c) (authorizing legislature to construct narrow restrictions to open 
records requirement that are “no broader than necessary to accomplish the stated purpose of the law”); Fink v. 
Lefkowitz, 393 N.E.2d 463, 466 n.* (N.Y. 1979) (characterizing New York’s Freedom of Information Law as 
“patterned after the federal analogue”); Times Mirror Co. v. Superior Court, 813 P.2d 240, 247 (Cal. 1991) 
(characterizing California’s Public Records Act as “modeled on” the federal FOIA, with general disclosure 
requirements and specific exceptions); see also Teresa Dale Pupillo, The Changing Weather Forecast: Government 
in the Sunshine in the 1990’s—An Analysis of State Sunshine Laws, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 1165, 1172-73 (1993) 
(summarizing range of statutory exceptions to state open meetings laws).  
103  Edward Shils made an analogous argument five decades ago when he analyzed secrecy and openness as 
results of opposing historical trends that remain in play in contemporary politics, law, and government.  See SHILS, 
supra note 22, at 24-25. 
104  At present, disclosure advocates, many of whom oppose at least some of the Bush Administration’s 
politics, represent this position.  See, e.g., REPORTERS’ COMM. FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, Foreword, in 
HOMEFRONT CONFIDENTIAL: HOW THE WAR ON TERRORISM AFFECTS ACCESS TO INFORMATION AND THE PUBLIC’S 
RIGHT TO KNOW (5th ed., September 2004), available at http://www.rcfp.org/homefrontconfidential/foreword.html 
(Mar. 6, 2005) (calling for the public and media “to push back” and restore the balance of disclosure and secrecy 
that the Bush Administration has upset); Blanton, supra note 10, at 33 (arguing that because disclosure inevitably 
loses to security concerns in the disclosure/exemption balance, the very idea of a “balance” should be replaced with 
an enforced regime of open government in which exemptions from disclosure are limited, if not abolished entirely). 
105  This is precisely what happened following the 2000 election, when the kinds of allegations of rampant 
secrecy that plagued the Clinton administration were visited upon the Bush administration.  On the Clinton era, see 
Gary Ferguson & David Bowermaster, Whatever It Is, Bill Clinton Likely Did It, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, 
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conclude that the balance between disclosure and privilege has produced a sufficient quantity of 
government information to allow a functioning, competitive democratic system—albeit one that 
produces a significant quantity of fulminating rhetoric regarding excess secrecy, corruption, and 
conspiracy.   
 
And yet, the balance appears not to be working.  The main parties to information 
disclosure disputes—the Executive Branch, Congress, and interested members of the public—
remain convinced that this balancing act is a failure.  Inter-branch disputes over information the 
President is unwilling to release to Congress arise repeatedly; the public remains largely ignorant 
about the actions of its government; disclosure laws continue to exact financial, deliberative, and 
bureaucratic burdens on government, even when disclosure serves no useful purpose; and vast 
quantities of information, some of which may offer significant insight for the public’s 
understanding current politics and policy, remain secret.  We have achieved rhetorical consensus 
regarding transparency’s value, and generated costly and elaborate bureaucratic solutions in an 
effort to pursue it.  But we have not actually achieved the goals of transparency in practice, and 
yet we have generated enormous administrative costs from our efforts. 
 
A central cause of these frustrations, the remainder of this Article asserts, lies in the 
conceptual framework underlying the disclosure/ privilege balance struck by transparency 
theory—that is, in the terms and framing of the debate between transparency advocates and 
skeptics.  The balances struck by the Judiciary in the executive privilege doctrine and the 
Congress in FOIA presume that suitably narrow disclosure requirements based on the type of 
information requested and the context in which it is produced will advance democracy and lead 
to positive consequences while protecting government and avoiding negative consequences.  
This presumption itself, based on abstractions posed by debates within transparency theory, 
relies on a series of component assumptions that, on closer examination, appear both empirically 
problematic and conceptually flawed.  I turn to these flaws in Part III. 
 
III.  OPACITY 
Transparency theory, composed of the assumptions shared among transparency advocates 
and skeptics about information and its capacity to be communicated to the public, ultimately 
leads to laws and policies that misconstrue the issues at stake in the relationship between 
disclosure, democracy, and the bureaucratic state.  These errors arise from transparency theory’s 
positing of a set of discernible and coherent actors and entities involved in the production and 
reception of information:  first, a producer and sender of messages, the state, that can be forced 
to divulge information that it would otherwise seek to hoard; second, messages, whether in the 
form of documents or meetings, whose existence and meaning are self-evident; and third, 
receivers, in the form of an audience or public, who are able and motivated to understand 
disclosed messages and their significance.  Put schematically, the assumptions look like this:  
 
1. government constitutes a potential “sender” of its information, so long as we impose 
the proper disclosure requirements upon it; 
                                                                                                                                                             
Aug. 8, 1994, at 29; Philip Weiss, Clinton Crazy, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Feb. 23, 1997, at 36.  On allegations of 
secrecy in the Bush administration, see sources cited supra notes 11 & 12. 
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2. government information constitutes a message necessary for a functional democracy, 
so long as it is disclosed; 
3. and the public awaits disclosure of government information, and will act in 
predictable, informed ways, so long as it has access to government information. 
 
At its core, then, transparency theory takes the form of a classic, linear model of 
communication that posits a simple process of information transmission from a source to an 
intended audience via the medium of a message.106  The most famous such model sought to 
enable the evaluation of a communications technology’s ability to transmit information 
efficiently and effectively,107 and was subsequently utilized within the emerging field of mass 
communications research as a means to conceptualize the processes and effects of the mass 
media.108  Transparency theory asserts that government information works in the same manner, 
by assuming the existence of a nascent (and beneficial) communications process that is blocked 
by the state.  Communication can occur, and therefore stronger democracy can emerge, once the 
state is pried open and its information set free.  Like the information and mass communications 
theory upon which it appears to build, this model fails because of its simplistic, inaccurate 
conception of how communication actually works.109  As a result, the model obfuscates or 
ignores the complexity of its component parts:  modern government’s sprawling, often 
incoherent bureaucracy, the slippery nature of “information,” the elusive and frustrating 
capacities of the public, and, ultimately, the difficulties of the communications process itself.   
 
In the first three sections that follow, I explain the weaknesses of transparency theory by 
focusing on its assumptions of a “sender,” “message,” and “receiver” of government 
information.  I close by explaining how this model serves as a flawed model for open 
government laws.   
 
A. The Sender: The State and Information 
The traditional account of transparency presumes the existence of a coherent, responsible, 
and responsive state in the traditional form that exists as a model of democratic government in 
liberal political theory.  This represents two errors that I describe in this section:  the 
contemporary state is not particularly coherent, and the dynamics of modern bureaucracy are 
such that the state is not responsive.  
  
1.  The Incoherent State 
Although the nation state retains its power both as an existing apparatus of sovereign 
control over geographically identifiable jurisdictions, the “technologies” of power are themselves 
dispersed to multiple, overlapping entities, many of which have no direct relationship with 
government as traditionally understood.110  The concept of a unified, coherent, sovereign state, 
                                                 
106  See Wilbur Schramm, Information Theory and Mass Communication, 32 JOURNALISM Q. 131 (1955). 
107  See Claude Shannon, A Mathematical Theory of Communication, 27 BELL SYS. TECH. J. 379 (1948). 
108  See HANNO HARDT, CRITICAL COMMUNICATION STUDIES: COMMUNICATION, HISTORY & THEORY IN 
AMERICA 77-90 (1992).   
109  See Part III-D, infra. 
110  See NIKOLAS ROSE, POWERS OF FREEDOM: REFRAMING POLITICAL THOUGHT 16-20 (1999). 
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whether in its general form as an ideal or in its particular form in the United States, is 
increasingly under threat from above, in the form of greater economic, military, political, and 
legal interdependence among nations.111  America’s federalist system and tri-partite federal 
system of powers also create multiple, overlapping layers of governmental jurisdiction and 
competencies that at times cooperate with each other and at other times conflict.  Thus the nation 
state and its subsidiary units have neither the status nor the power and coherence that classical 
political theory presumes,112 given the state’s remarkable, often paralyzing complexity, the 
political limits placed on its activities, and the near-universal critique of “government”—whether 
in the form of calls for its “reinvention” or for its abandonment.113  This is merely a descriptive 
claim; whether the movement it describes signals the possible emergence of a better, multi-level 
“cosmopolitan democracy,”114 a complex “global system of regulated regimes composed of 
locales and regions in a federated system,”115 or a more frightening transnational “Empire”116 is 
irrelevant for my purposes.  More important is its multi-layered, overlapping structures that 
appear incoherent and often conflict with each other.   
 
Sovereign states and identifiable state actors do continue to exist, of course, and 
American governmental entities are subject to openness requirements imposed by constitutions 
and laws of administrative procedure at the state and federal levels.  But at the same time, 
complicated governmental structures make the prospect of identifying the actor that contributed 
to or finalized a particular governmental decision, or that holds particular government 
information, an increasingly complicated endeavor.117  Consider, for example, the sprawling 
Department of Homeland Security, which, as one commentator has noted, represents an 
“agglomeration of agencies, each with its own set of rules and procedures and unique culture, 
[and] raises a host of administrative, regulatory and governmental organization issues that likely 
will take years to resolve.”118  When one seeks information about operations relating to 
“homeland security,” then, whom does one contact?  Contemporary military actions such as the 
“War on Terror” similarly require a vast number of agencies with confusingly overlapping 
responsibilities.  Thus, when the ACLU sought documents relating to alleged abuse of prisoners 
                                                 
111  See JOHN HOFFMAN, BEYOND THE STATE 209-13 (1995); Helen Stacy, Relational Sovereignty, 55 STAN. L. 
REV. 2029, 2037-39 (2003); David Held, Democracy: From City-States to a Cosmopolitan Order?, in PROSPECTS 
FOR DEMOCRACY 10 (David Held ed., 1993). 
112  Balakrishnan Rajagopal, International Law and Social Movements: Challenges of Theorizing Resistance, 
41 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 397, 411-12 (2003). 
113  See CLAUS OFFE, MODERNITY AND THE STATE 64-65 (1996). 
114  DAVID HELD, DEMOCRACY AND THE GLOBAL ORDER 270-83 (1995). 
115  Iris Marion Young, Self-Determination and Global Democracy, in NOMOS XLII: DESIGNING DEMOCRATIC 
INSTITUTIONS 147, 174 (Ian Shapiro & Stephen Macedo eds., N.Y.U. Press 2000).   
116  MICHAEL HARDT & ANTONIO NEGRI, EMPIRE 3-21 (2000). 
117  One litigation manual describes in detail the various issues that a person seeking information must resolve 
in choosing the correct agency and address an initial request:  which agency or agencies with whom to file the 
request; the proper procedures to use for those agencies; which office or offices of those agencies to contact; 
whether the documents may have been moved to storage in the Federal Records Center or the National Archives; 
which agencies may have additional exemptions in their organic or program statutes that would allow them to avoid 
disclosure; and what contents to include in the initial request.  See HENRY A. HAMMITT ET AL., LITIGATION UNDER 
THE FEDERAL OPEN GOVERNMENT LAWS 19-25 (2002). 
118  William S. Morrow, Jr., Administrative, Regulatory and Organizational Challenges Facing the New 
Homeland Security Department, ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS, Summer 2003, at 11. 
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held overseas by the United States, it filed FOIA requests with, among other agencies, the 
Department of Defense, the Department of Homeland Security, the Justice Department and many 
of its components, the CIA, and the Department of State.119   
 
The proliferation of public entities is not the only cause of complexity and confusion.  
Widespread efforts at the federal and state level to contract with private entities to provide 
services, either on behalf or in place of government, further complicate traditional conceptions of 
the state.120  Consider, for example, the effects from the increasing privatization of activities 
previously performed entirely or largely by federal and state agencies.121  Whatever the merits of 
the military’s increased reliance on private contractors in its peacekeeping missions and in the 
war and occupation of Iraq, such reliance makes an area of government operations that was 
already significantly less than transparent even more opaque and less accountable to the 
public.122  Some state governments retain only limited oversight over the privately owned and 
operated state prisons with which they have contracted to hold their prisoners, while they shield 
the prison operators from the disclosure requirements imposed on similar state-run facilities.123   
 
Congress and courts have formulated complicated, indeterminate rules to resolve this 
fundamental conflict between laws intended to cover government agencies and the increasing 
reliance by those agencies on private firms for research and for the operation of traditional 
government functions.  Congressional efforts to resolve this conflict under FOIA have proven 
largely unsuccessful.  Sorting whether an entity is an “agency” for purposes of FOIA is one 
confusing issue.124  Another is the definition of an “agency record,” which the Supreme Court 
                                                 
119  See American Civil Liberties Union v. Department of Defense, 339 F.Supp.2d 501, 502 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
120  See Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1285, 1306 
(2003).  Although discovery requests imposed on private contracts may be analogous to open records acts and may 
be served on non-parties to litigation, private causes of action have procedural hurdles that few open government 
laws require.  Compare Jack M. Beermann, Administrative-Law-Like Obligations on Private[ized] Entities, 49 
UCLA L. Rev. 1717, 1724 (2002) (analogizing discovery to FOIA), with Freeman, supra, at 1322-23 (critiquing 
Beermann’s argument). 
121  See Craig D. Feiser, Privatization and the Freedom of Information Act: An Analysis of Public Access to 
Private Entities Under Federal Law, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 21 (1999). 
122  On the specific issues arising from the use of military contractors in the Iraq occupation, see P.W. Singer, 
Nation Builders and Low Bidders in Iraq, NEW YORK TIMES, June 15, 2004, at A23.  On military and national 
security outsourcing generally, see P.W. SINGER, CORPORATE WARRIORS: THE RISE OF THE PRIVATIZED MILITARY 
INDUSTRY (2004); Ann R. Markusen, The Case Against Privatizing National Security, 16 GOVERNANCE 471, 489-90 
(2003)  
123  See Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367, 1392-94 (2003); Nicole 
Càsarez, Furthering the Accountability Principle in Privatized Federal Corrections: The Need for Access to Private 
Prison Records, 28 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 249, 268-291 (1995). 
124  See, e.g., Dong v. Smithsonian Inst., 125 F.3d 877 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (Smithsonian Institution is not an 
agency); Armstrong v. Executive Office of the President, 90 F.3d 553 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (National Security Council is 
not an agency); Armstrong v. Bush, 924 F.2d 282 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (the President is not an agency); Pub. Citizen 
Research Group v. Dep’t of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 668 F.2d 537 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (Professional Standards 
Review Organization, a private company that contracted to review Medicare and Medicaid providers, was not an 
agency); Irwin Mem’l Blood Bank v. Am. Nat’l Red Cross, 640 F.2d 1051 (9th Cir. 1981) (Red Cross is not an 
agency); Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (Office of Science and Technology is an agency).   
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has defined as a document that is within the possession and control of the government.125  These 
issues are especially important in the regulatory process, where federal agencies rely heavily on 
contractors or grantees to perform much of the essential empirical, scientific research on which 
regulations are based.  Efforts to clarify the legal status of records produced as a result of the 
agency-grantee and –contractor relationship have failed in part due to conflicts between 
Congress and the Executive Branch, and in part because of the difficulty of imposing 
transparency on the scientific process.126  The practice of contracting with private firms even 
creates some sharp ironies, as federal agencies have begun to contract out their own responses to 
FOIA requests127—leading inevitably to the issue of whether records produced by the private 
firms engaged in reviewing FOIA requests would themselves be subject to FOIA.  State courts 
and legislatures face the same issues, and have similarly failed to develop a consensus or clarity 
for their open government laws.128  For transparency advocates, the simple solution to the 
problem of whether public disclosure requirements apply to private firms is to characterize such 
firms as the relevant state actor with whom they have contracted, and to extend all open 
government obligations to all such private operations.129  And, of course, efforts to extend the 
burden of open government law compliance to private entities inevitably reduce the economic 
                                                 
125  See Kissinger v. Reporters Committee for the Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S. 135, 157 (1980).  Following 
Kissinger, courts have struggled over FOIA’s applicability when a document was not created by or is not currently 
possessed by an agency.  See, e.g., Dep’t of Justice v. Tax Analysts, 492 U.S. 136 (1989) (copies of federal court 
decisions in possession of agency were agency records); GE v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 750 F.2d 
1394 (7th Cir. 1984) (company’s internal report on nuclear reactor, which had been subpoenaed by the Commission 
in connection with a licensing proceeding, was an agency record); Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Employees Local 1923 v. 
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 712 F.2d 931 (4th Cir. 1983) (list of home addresses of employees of Social 
Security Administration headquarters were not agency records); Paisley v. CIA, 712 F.2d 686 (D.C. Cir. 1983) 
(documents created by agency in response to congressional investigation were agency records); Wolfe v. Dep’t of 
Health & Human Servs., 711 F.2d 1077 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (report prepared by president-elect’s transition team, in 
possession of the Secretary’s chief of staff, was not an agency record). 
126  See Donald T. Hornstein, Accounting for Science: The Independence of Public Research in the New, 
Subterranean Administrative Law, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 227, 237-46 (2003).  In 1980, the Supreme Court 
held that private organizations receiving financial grants from the federal government do not fall within the FOIA 
definition of “agency” unless a federal agency provides extensive and detailed supervision of their work.  Forsham 
v. Harris, 445 U.S. 169, 179 (1980).  In November 1998, Congress overturned Forsham by adding one sentence to 
the 4,000 pages of an omnibus spending bill that directed the Office of Management and Budget (“OMB”) to subject 
certain recipients of federal grants and “all data produced under an award” of a federal contract to a non-profit 
organization to FOIA.  See Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1999, Pub. L. 
No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681, at 2681-459 (1998).  The OMB Guidelines implementing Congress’s command is 
narrower in scope than the Amendment’s author intended, once again complicating the responsibility of private 
entities working for the federal government to comply with disclosure mandates under FOIA.  See O’REILLY, supra 
note 16, at § 4.10; Senator Richard Shelby, Accountability and Transparency: Public Access to Federally Funded 
Research Data, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 369 (2000). 
127  See Christopher Lee, On FOIA Front, More Agencies Contract Out, WASH. POST June 8, 2001, at A21. 
128  See Martin D. Bunker & Charles N. Davis, When Government “Contracts out”: Privatization, 
Accountability, and Constitutional Doctrine, in ACCESS DENIED: FREEDOM OF INFORMATION IN THE INFORMATION 
AGE 85, 90-93 (Charles N. Davis & Sigman L. Spichal eds., 2000); Craig D. Feiser, Protecting the Public’s Right to 
Know: The Debate Over Privatization and Access to Government Information Under State Law, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 825, 835 (2000). 
129  See Càsarez, supra note 123, at 300-03; Feiser, supra note 121, at 54-61. 
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and administrative advantages that originally led government agencies to privatize or contract 
out previously public services.130   
 
2. The Unresponsive State 
To further complicate the state’s role as sender in a linear communication process, recall 
that the transparency requirement is imposed—in the first instance legislatively, and then 
administratively through information requests or bureaucratic process, and finally, perhaps, 
through judicial command—upon the state apparatus, which may choose not to comply.  As Max 
Weber explained, the logic of bureaucratic administration rests in part on the production and 
hoarding of information, and on a bureaucracy’s “keeping secret its knowledge and intentions” 
from competing organizations and from the public.131  Inevitably, state institutions know what 
information they have produced and where such information is stored, and, through that 
monopoly of knowledge about their own information, retain significant discretion over the 
existence and ultimate release of documents.  Their knowledge extends not only over the content 
of such documents, but also over whether such documents reasonably fall within any statutory 
exemptions from disclosure—a judgment that state institutions make in the first instance.132  
Congress sought to address this asymmetry by allowing courts to examine documents in camera 
in order to determine the applicability of statutory exemptions.133  Federal courts have also 
attempted to mitigate the inequities further under FOIA by requiring an agency that seeks to 
avoid disclosure in some instances to produce an index that lists the documents the agency is 
refusing to release and the specific statutory exemptions that provide the authority for its 
refusal.134  But in the national security context, agencies have succeeded in gaining from 
Congress, the President, and courts the authority to refuse even to acknowledge the existence of 
information a requester seeks on the grounds that to do so would reveal intelligence methods and 
sources.135 
   
In short, the sprawling, multi-headed state must, to an extent, police itself.  As Weber 
argued, bureaucratization is an optimal process for carrying out specialized “administrative 
functions according to purely objective considerations.”136  Given its role as the producer and, 
under disclosure requirements, the initial sender of information, the bureaucratic state inevitably 
retains significant authority over the production and storage of government information.  In 
                                                 
130  Dan Guttman, Governance by Contract: Constitutional Visions; Time For Reflection and Choice, 33 PUB. 
CONT. L.J. 321, 345 (2004). 
131  See 2 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 992 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., 1968). 
132  See Vaughn, supra note 36, at xv. 
133  See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B). 
134  It is called a “Vaughn Index,” after the D.C. Circuit decision in Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820 
(D.C.Cir.1973).  .See generally O’REILLY, supra note 16, at § 8.16 (explaining that the Vaughn Index has become 
“the foundation for adversarial argument” in litigation over complex FOIA disputes).   
135  See, e.g., 5 USC § 552(c)(1)-(3). (authorizing agencies to treat records as not subject to FOIA at all if 
disclosure of the existence of the records “could reasonably be expected to interfere with [law] enforcement 
proceedings”); Executive Order 13292, 68 Fed. Reg. 15315, at § 3.6(a) (Mar. 28, 2003) (authorizing agencies to 
refuse to confirm or deny the existence of requested records “whenever the fact of their existence or nonexistence is 
itself classified”); Bassiouni v. C.I.A., 392 F.3d 244, 245-47 (7th Cir. 2004) (upholding CIA’s refusal to 
acknowledge existence of information that may impact intelligence operations and national security).  
136  See 2 WEBER, supra note 131, at 975. 
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bureaucratic organizations, information enables its holder to perform his or her functions—often 
more effectively by virtue of keeping that information from others—and to amass power.137  
Bureaucracy’s relationship to democracy and popular rule in the modern state is thus 
contradictory: a democracy may simultaneously desire a functional bureaucracy despite the 
bureaucratic production of secrets, while it also attempts to impede the bureaucracy’s growth in 
part out of fear that these secrets disrupt popular rule.138  Efforts to stop bureaucratic secrecy or 
impose disclosure requirements to mitigate it, in short, run counter to the necessary and 
inevitable dynamics of the bureaucratic state.  In its multiple forms, the state may indeed produce 
messages, but characterizing the state as an actual, willing, or even acquiescent “sender” of its 
information under current government disclosure laws misunderstands the operations of the 
modern state apparatus.  In the words of sociologist David Beetham, “[o]penness is the keystone 
of democratic politics, but proposals to achieve it are likely to prove insufficient when they take 
no account of the pressures causing secretiveness in the first place.”139   
 
B. The Message:  Government Information 
The traditional account of transparency presumes that the message or text of government 
information is discernible and can be transmitted in the form it was produced by the sender.  This 
represents two errors:  it assumes the existence of a message outside of the context of 
government disclosure laws themselves, and it assumes the possibility of that message’s 
transmission without distortion or effect.  Instead, any “message” that government information 
comprises is produced and only exists within a political and regulatory framework that shapes its 
creation, and only circulates within a mediated environment that reshapes it in the process of 
making it available.   
 
1. Government Information Does Not Exist 
Just as the extent of intellectual property protection structures the kinds of research and 
creativity that individuals and institutions undertake,140 so the rules of open government that 
exempt certain types of information from disclosure lead officials and agencies to behave in 
particular ways when they prefer to keep their conduct or the information they produce secret.141  
Scholars have long known that governmental bodies will shift decision-making processes in 
response to open government requirements.142  Producers or custodians of information shift the 
medium, classification, or content of information they prefer to keep secret towards the safe 
harbors provided under the exceptions to disclosure laws.  Thus, for example, members of a 
                                                 
137  See id. at 992. 
138  See id. at 988, 990-92; WOLFGANG J. MOMMSEN, THE POLITICAL AND SOCIAL THEORY OF MAX WEBER 110 
(1989); Sheldon Wolin, Max Weber: Legitimation, Method, and the Politics of Theory, 9 POL. THEORY 401, 412 
(1981). 
139  See DAVID BEETHAM, BUREAUCRACY 101 (2nd ed. 1996). 
140  See JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS 13 (1996). 
141  See, e.g., Marshall, supra note 2, at 814 (arguing that officials who fear disclosure requirements are less 
likely to air dissenting views, will not memorialize their views, will have their views discounted even if they are 
communicated orally because they are not memorialized, and their views will not become part of government’s 
institutional memory); Turley, supra note 13, at 209 (predicting that as a result of adverse executive privilege 
decisions during the Clinton Administration, the conduct of White House meetings was likely to change, as was the 
willingness of staff to take notes during meetings). 
142  See ROBERT LUCE, LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURE 142 (1922). 
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legislative or regulatory body subject to open meetings and public records laws may 
communicate with each other or meet by means (such as by person-to-person oral 
communications or in less than a quorum) so that the “information” they produce falls outside 
the ambit of applicable state transparency requirements.143   
 
Similarly, the tendency of those with original and derivative classification authority to 
overclassify documents demonstrates the regular practice of disclosure avoidance.144  Agencies 
widely delegate to mid-level managers the authority to classify information within categories that 
restrict public access,145 while a 1997 congressional commission estimated that a total of three 
million government and industry employees have authority to limit public access to government 
documents.146  At the same time, safely classifying a document requires little more than fitting 
some of the document’s information within one of the broad and vague categories provided by 
the Executive Order establishing the classification system.147  For documents at the margins of 
the definition of classification, numerous factors come into play in the decision to classify, 
including risk aversion,148 political gain,149 or a desire to cover up government incompetence.150  
                                                 
143  State open meetings laws take a variety of approaches to the issue of what constitutes a “meeting” to which 
sunshine laws apply.  Some state legislation sweeps broadly and prohibits any meeting between two or more 
members of a public body without public notice and access; while other states define a “meeting” narrowly to 
encompass only those gatherings where a quorum is present to discuss official business.  See ANN TAYLOR 
SCHWING, OPEN MEETINGS LAWS, at § 6.6 (2d ed. 2000).  
144  See MOYNIHAN COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 49, at 7-8; Wells supra note 10, at 1201-02; Edward L. 
Xanders, A Handyman's Guide to Fixing National Security Leaks: An Analytical Framework for Evaluating 
Proposals to Curb Unauthorized Publication of Classified Information, 5 J.L. POL. 759, 768-69 (1989).  
Classification decisions are governed by Executive Order.  See Exec. Order No. 13,292, 3 C.F.R. 196 (2003) 
(providing the current standards, authority, categories, and duration by which information may classified); see 
generally Wells, supra note 10, at 1198-99. 
145  Nearly 4,000 federal officials have the delegated authority to stamp a document “top secret,” “secret” or 
“confidential” under multiple sets of complex rules.   See Michael J. Sniffen,  'Secrets' Perplex Panel; Classified 
Data Growing to Include 'Comically Irrelevant,' WASH. POST, Sept. 3, 2004, at A17.  Agencies as diverse as the 
Departments of Transportation and Agriculture delegate such authority widely among administrators.   See, e.g., 70 
Fed. Reg. 2819 (2005) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 1) (delegating authority to designate information as “sensitive 
security information” to all administrators and the general counsel of the Department of Transportation); U.S. Dept 
of Agriculture, Departmental Regulation No. 3440-002 (delegating similar authority to Under and Assistant 
Secretaries, Agency Administrators, Regional Directors, Office Directors, and Heads of Field Establishments), 
available at http://www.ocio.usda.gov/directives/files/dr/DR3440-002.htm. 
146  See MOYNIHAN COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 49, at 31.  Those with so-called “derivative” 
classification authority perform the vast majority of classification actions.  See ibid. (citing figure of 94 percent of 
classification actions over six-year period prior to the report). 
147  See MOYNIHAN COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 49, at 21-22. 
148  See MOYNIHAN COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 49, at 19 (calling for the shift from a “risk avoidance 
approach to security [classification], which seeks to anticipate all risks in the protection of assets, with a risk 
management approach, which seeks to concentrate limited resources on those assets the loss of which would have 
the most profound effect on the national security”); Saloschin, supra note 62, at 1406 (noting tendency of 
government attorneys and agency managers to prefer non-disclosure in order to protect institutions and clients).  
149  See Robert Corn-Revere, New Technology and the First Amendment: Breaking the Cycle of Repression, 17 
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 247, 336 (1994). 
150  See Erwin N. Griswold, Secrets Not Worth Keeping, WASH. POST, Feb. 15, 1989, at A25 (former Solicitor 
General who had defended the government's attempt to suppress the Pentagon Papers, noting that “there is massive 
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According to recent testimony before a subcommittee of the House of Representatives by the 
deputy undersecretary of defense for counterintelligence and security, misclassification is the 
result of government officials who misunderstand classification requirements, fail to declassify 
data that is no longer sensitive, and ignore the needs or interests of the public.151  At bottom, 
overclassification represents a bureaucratic tendency—perhaps intentional, perhaps merely by 
default—to utilize a legal technology to protect information from disclosure.  Tellingly, the 
inadvertent release of classified documents is far rarer than the inadvertent classification of 
information that does not warrant protection.152 
 
When an agency or an individual government official prefers to protect information from 
disclosure, then, the agency or official is more likely to produce it in a form, circulate it by a 
method, and/ or maintain or destroy it so that the information will either fall outside disclosure 
requirements or avoid detection.  Although no legal (or illegal) form or method of resisting 
disclosure is foolproof, the very attempt demonstrates the fact that communications technologies 
and the media of memorialization are fungible.  If the form of government information is 
fungible and officials and agencies are likely to resist disclosure, then no essential thing called 
“government information” exists that can be perfectly regulated to achieve transparency. 
 
2. Government Information Has No Meaning. 
Transparency theory presumes that the intent of the government as author, as well as the 
political and bureaucratic significance of any piece of government information, are manifest in 
its text.  This presumption ignores the complexity of “signification” or meaning-making, the 
processes by which any document or oral communication can be said to communicate to, and 
have significance for, an audience.153  Communicative messages are subject to formal and 
informal rules of language, as well as to the generic and conventional structures through which, 
for example, bureaucracies operate.154  Hermeneutic, structuralist, and poststructuralist theories 
                                                                                                                                                             
overclassification and that the principal concern of the classifiers is not with national security, but rather with 
government embarrassment of one sort or another”). 
151  See Sniffen, supra note 145, at A17. 
152  To illustrate, according to a recently declassified Department of Energy study, fewer than 1600 of the 1.36 
million pages of data related to nuclear weapons that had been publicly released by military departments between 
1995 and 1999 contained information classified as “restricted data” or “formerly restricted data.”  In fact, the vast 
majority of inadvertently released classified data should not have been classified in the first place.  See U.S. 
Department of Energy Office of Classification and Information Control, Fifteenth Report on Inadvertent Releases of 
Restricted Data and Formerly Restricted Data under Executive Order 12958, DOE/SO-10-0015 (Deleted Version), 
available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/doe/inadvertent15.pdf.  
153  By “signification,” I refer not only to the term’s initial use within semiotics as a process of meaning 
creation, see Paul Perron, Semiotics, in THE JOHNS HOPKINS GUIDE TO LITERARY THEORY & CRITICISM 658 
(Michael Groden & Martin Kreisworth eds., 1994), but as the concept of meaning production has since been taken 
up by virtually all structuralist and poststructuralist literary and cultural theories.  See MODERN CRITICISM AND 
THEORY: A READER 1 (David Lodge ed. 1988) (introducing excerpt from Ferdinand de Saussure’s Course in 
General Linguistics and noting its pervasive influence in literary criticism and theory); Richard Johnson, What Is 
Cultural Studies Anyway?, in WHAT IS CULTURAL STUDIES? A READER 76, 96-98 (ed. John Storey, 1996) (noting 
role of semiotics and theories of the text in the development of cultural studies).  For a thorough introduction to 
semiotics, see Barton Beebe, The Semiotic Analysis of Trademark Law, 51 UCLA L. Rev. 621, 626-45 (2004). 
154  See Stuart Hall, Encoding/Decoding, in CULTURE, MEDIA AND LANGUAGE 129 (Stuart Hall et al. eds., 
1980). 
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of textual interpretation have destabilized notions that the “text” exists somewhere apart from the 
interpretive moment; rather, the text, in its multiple meanings, emerges from the social, 
institutional, historical, intertextual, and discursive context within which the reader engages with 
it.155   
 
Administrative agencies communicate through a variety of highly structured events and 
types of documents— noticed and open meetings, notices of proposed rulemakings, official 
memoranda and informal electronic correspondence, and the like—that themselves operate 
within certain statutory rules and historical norms, and which in turn condition the form in which 
government information appears.  The moments in which a government official or other 
individual encodes a written or spoken statement that becomes government information, and the 
moments in which that information is disclosed and then decoded by members of the public, are 
separate and distinct.  There is no necessary correspondence between the official or officials who 
create and then write or speak “government information” and the public that may receive it; 
therefore, the intermediary in the transaction, the document or meeting that contains 
“government information,” is not a static thing with stable meaning.156  Given the complex 
process of translating data and information between institutional contexts, and the different 
historical and social contexts of the text’s production and its interpretation, “government 
information” has no pure, essential form.157    
 
Transparency theory not only fails to consider the problem of the text, it also ignores the 
effects of information’s transmission and distribution.158  The technologies and institutions of 
mass communications—from print to electronic to broadcast to digital media, from major daily 
newspapers to cable and network television news shows to informational and explicitly partisan 
websites—through which people access disclosed government information affect the message 
contained therein and its interpretation. One need not go to McLuhanesque lengths159 to 
recognize that individual media technologies shape the form that messages take and establish 
distinct dynamics in the relationships between sender and receiver.160  At the same time, media 
                                                 
155  To avoid the pain of an exceedingly long footnote, I offer TERRY EAGLETON, LITERARY THEORY: AN 
INTRODUCTION chs. 2-4 (2d ed. 1996).  Legal scholarship has incorporated such theories, most typically for purposes 
of explaining the difficult of judicial interpretation.  See Stephen M. Feldman, The Politics of Postmodern 
Jurisprudence, 95 MICH. L. REV. 166 (1996); Nouri Gana, Beyond the Pale: Toward an Exemplary Relationship 
Between the Judge and the Literary Critic, 15 LAW & LIT. 313, 327 (2003); Peter C. Schanck, Understanding 
Postmodern Thought and Its Implications for Statutory Interpretation, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2505 (1992). 
156  See Hall, supra note 154, at 131, 136. 
157  See Steven Mailloux, Interpretation, in CRITICAL TERMS FOR LITERARY STUDY 121 (ed. Frank Lentricchia 
& Thomas McLaughlin, 2d ed. 1995). 
158  The original model of linear communication, which focused on solving the engineering problems of 
distance and mass communications, considered the technological issues of transmission and reception.  See 
Shannon, supra note 107, at 380. 
159  I refer here to a strain of technological determinism associated with the Canadian media theorist Marshall 
McLuhan.  See MARSHALL MCLUHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA: THE EXTENSIONS OF MAN 7 (1964) (“The medium 
is the message.”). 
160  I make this claim in a limited fashion, not to posit the dawning of a revolutionary new “information 
society” where digitization and the internet offers a vastly new universe, but as a more humble, commonsensical 
claim that a text’s medium (print, sound, motion picture, and the like), its means of transmission (physical in the 
case of print or projected film, or using limited spectrum or high bandwidth capacity), and the potential for 
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institutions play enormously important roles as gatekeepers of information that select and present 
news within organizational, professional, economic, and ideological constraints.161  Consider the 
incentive and institutional structures within which the press and its employees operate.  Media 
companies and their employees seek financial gain, compete with each other, attempt to further 
political objectives, and strive to meet professional goals of achievement.  These objectives, and 
the discipline that attempting to meet them imposes, may in some instances lead news 
organizations to serve as a conduit of information that would help create an informed, 
deliberative public.  But more often, they will incline the media towards creating and finding 
political scandal rather than focusing on and explaining political issues and development,162 and 
towards producing depoliticized, risk-averse, and entertainment-focused content.163  
Contemporary politicians and officials recognize these tendencies and exploit them by 
strategically disclose “information” through coordinated public relations campaigns that produce 
pre-packaged, tightly controlled “news.”164 
 
In this institutional and technological process, the texts of government information are 
edited, explained, de- and recontextualized, and interpreted.  Put in the context of its underlying 
model of information and communication, transparency theory’s conception of information 
ignores “noise,” random disturbances introduced by something other than the communicator that 
inhibit the perfect transmission of information,165 and thereby fails to note that human 
communication processes which are dependent upon symbolic and technological means are 
inherently imperfect.166  Thus, the subset of government texts that are ultimately disclosed do not 
appear to the public as raw information that is ready, in its capacity as the carrier of the stuff of 
                                                                                                                                                             
immediate interactivity affects the “message” that is sent.  See generally HAROLD INNIS, THE BIAS OF 
COMMUNICATION (1951) (describing development and impacts on human society of new communications 
technologies); EVERETT M. ROGERS, COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY 9 (1986) (identifying significant features of 
new communications technologies).  On the complex, ideological formation of the notion of an “information 
society,” see Ann Balsamo, Myths of Information: The Cultural Impact of New Information, in THE INFORMATION 
REVOLUTION: CURRENT AND FUTURE CONSEQUENCES 225 (A.L. Porter & W.H. Read eds., 1998). 
161  See DENIS MCQUAIL, MCQUAIL’S MASS COMMUNICATION THEORY 244-98 (4th ed. 2000); HERBERT I. 
SCHILLER, INFORMATION INEQUALITY 43-47 (1996).  For a summary and review of the literature on the analog and 
digital media industries and their tendency towards consolidation, see Ellen P. Goodman, Media Policy Out of the 
Box: Content Abundance, Attention Scarcity, and the Failures of Digital Markets, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1389, 
1445-55 (2004).  
162  See JOHN B. THOMPSON, POLITICAL SCANDAL: POWER AND VISIBILITY IN THE MEDIA AGE 75-84 (2000). 
163  See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 58-62 (1995); Robert W. 
McChesney, The Political Economy of Global Communication, in CAPITALISM AND THE INFORMATION AGE 1, 15-20 
(Robert W. McChesney et al. eds., 1998). 
164  See KEVIN R. KOSAR, PUBLIC RELATIONS AND PROPAGANDA: RESTRICTIONS ON EXECUTIVE AGENCY 
ACTIVITIES 1-4 (Congressional Research Service, Order Code No. RL3275, 2005) (listing recent controversies 
surrounding administrative agencies’ use of public relations campaigns), available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/RL32750.pdf (Feb. 28, 2005); David Barstow & Robin Stein, Under Bush, a New Age of 
Prepackaged News, N.Y. TIMES, March 13, 2005, at A1 (reporting that at least 20 federal agencies have produced 
news segments that were subsequently incorporated, without attribution, into local television broadcasts). 
165  CLAUDE SHANNON & WARREN WEAVER, THE MATHEMATICAL THEORY OF COMMUNICATION (1949); 
Schramm, supra note 106, at 135-36 . 
166  See GRAEME PATTERSON, HISTORY AND COMMUNICATIONS 100-01 (1990). 
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government and politics, to enable democracy and produce the consequences anticipated by 
transparency advocates.167   
 
C. The Receiver: The Public and Government Information 
The traditional account of transparency presumes that the public receives and reacts in a 
rational and predictable way to government information disclosed by the state.  But as with its 
assumptions about the sender and message, traditional conceptions of transparency fail to 
account for the complex processes within which the public “receives” government information 
and then incorporates (or fails to incorporate) that information within its resulting political 
attitudes and behavior.  Just as the “text” assumed in transparency theory does not exist in any 
pure form, so the “public” as an interested, informed, and rational collective does not exist either.   
 
   Transparency theory presumes, in the first instance, the existence of an interested public 
that needs and wants to be fully informed.  This presumption badly needs proof.168  A vast body 
of empirical studies demonstrates citizens’ lack of political knowledge.169  Summarizing the 
extent of voter ignorance, one commentator has concluded that voters are ignorant about specific 
policy issues and the basic structure of government, lack ideological consistency in issue stances, 
and have been found to be consistently ignorant about politics by survey research into the matter 
since the late 1930s.170  Public choice theory explains this finding by asserting that voters, to the 
extent that they have any interest in politics at all, are more interested in policy outcomes than 
policy inputs, have an infinitesimally small impact on political decisionmaking as individuals, 
and have few incentives to spend the resources required to acquire information.171  Thus the 
public’s ignorance is rational and will not be mitigated in the abstract much, if at all, by efforts to 
increase the disclosure of government information, especially given the already existing 
“superabundance” of information available from existing sources.172   
 
                                                 
167  Even websites that merely make raw documents available in the form in which they received them, such as 
that of the public interest website of the National Security Archive and the commercial website The Smoking Gun, 
select and edit these documents, and in posting them implicitly (and at times explicitly) make editorial comments.  
See http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/ (Feb. 11, 2005); http://www.thesmokinggun.com/ (Feb. 11, 2005) 
168  See Peter Dennis Bathory & Wilson Carey McWilliams, Political Theory and the People's Right to Know, 
in GOVERNMENT SECRECY IN DEMOCRACIES 3, 13-15 (Itzhak Galnoor ed., 1977) (questioning existence of a public 
that wants to be, and is capable of being, informed). 
169  For a thorough examination of the literature, see Samuel DaCanio, Beyond Marxist State Theory: 
Autonomy in Democratic Societies, 14 CRIT. REV. 215, 219-21 (2000). 
170  See Ilya Somin, Voter Ignorance and the Democratic Ideal, 12 CRIT. REV. 413, 417-19 (1998). 
171  See ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 238-59 (1957); Richard A. Posner, Free 
Speech in an Economic Perspective, 20 SUFFOLK L. REV. 1, 51 (1986). 
172  Philip E. Converse, Popular Representation and the Distribution of Information, in INFORMATION AND 
DEMOCRATIC PROCESSES 369-371 (John A. Ferejohn & James H. Kuklinski eds., 1990).  Indeed, the informational 
excess of contemporary politics and culture might itself constitute a barrier to better, more informed political 
decisionmaking and activity, insofar as it leads to the public’s inability to believe that any information is definitive.  
See JODI DEAN, PUBLICITY’S SECRET: HOW TECHNOCULTURE CAPITALIZES ON DEMOCRACY 163 (2002).  Thus, 
widespread voter ignorance could be explained as not irrational by noting the difficulty for every voter, no matter 
the extent of their knowledge, to gain sufficiently reliable information about the effects of any political decision by 
an elected official given the relative inability to interpret the meaning of the available information.  See Jeffrey 
Friedman, Introduction: Public Ignorance and Democratic Theory, 12 CRIT. REV. 397, 408-09 (1998). 
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Efforts to complicate the assumptions of rational actor models and voter ignorance 
through the insights of behavioral and cognitive psychology do not change this conclusion 
drastically.  These fields have identified the heuristic devices, or rules of thumb, that shape 
individuals’ judgment processes and lead to reflexive, often inaccurate perceptions, and that 
further cast doubt on the existence of the deliberative, open-ended, and open-minded decisional 
processes that transparency advocates assume to be possible.173  Candidates and political parties 
may serve as helpful, though still imperfect, heuristic devices that enable voters to choose in 
relatively rational and informed ways,174 but such short-cuts do not help voters to understand and 
decide on positions regarding complicated matters of national and political importance for which 
clear heuristic cues are unavailable.175  Consider, for example, public knowledge and opinion 
during the period prior to the invasion of Iraq in 2003.  Long after sufficient information existed 
to disprove the contention, large segments of the American public believed (and to an extent 
continue to believe) in a proved link between Saddam Hussein, al Qaeda, and the September 11 
terrorism attacks, in part because of the Bush administration’s speculative insistence on such a 
connection in the period immediately prior to and following the end of official hostilities in the 
war in Iraq.176  In trusting the administration’s account, some members of the public who voted 
for President Bush in the 2004 election, by relying on heuristic devices or employing rational 
calculation, may have ignored or chosen to disbelieve contrary evidence.  But, at minimum, they 
voted to re-elect the President despite publicly available information regarding one of the central, 
pre-war justifications for invading Iraq.177  Accordingly, merely requiring disclosure of more 
information might have little effect in the face of efforts to manipulate such information through 
false or misleading statements.178 
 
In addition to assuming the public is attentive, interested, and knowledgeable, 
transparency theory further presumes that the public understands and learns from the government 
information that is or should be released in predictable ways.  But the public’s pre-existing 
knowledge and capacity to understand information are limited, and the public in turn understands 
                                                 
173  See REID HASTIE & ROBYN M. DAWES, RATIONAL CHOICE IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD 7 (2001); Thomas 
Gilovich & Dale Griffin, Introduction—Heurists and Biases, Then and Now, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE 
PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 1, 15-16 (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002); Cass R. Sunstein, Introduction, 
in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 1, 3 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000). 
174  See DOWNS, supra note 171, at 100, 210;  Richard R. Lau & David P. Redlawsk, Voting Correctly, 91 AM. 
POL. SCI. REV. 585, 594 (1997). 
175  See Michael S. Kang, Democratizing Direct Democracy: Restoring Voter Competence Through Heuristic 
Cues and “Disclosure Plus,” 50 UCLA L. REV. 1141, 1160-61 (2003). 
176  See Many Think Iraq, al-Qaeda Linked, GAINESVILLE SUN, April 23, 2004, at 9A; Dana Milbank & Claudia 
Deane, Hussein Link to 9/11 Lingers in Many Minds, WASH. POST, Sept. 6, 2003, A1.   
177  Divergent, often incorrect views on evidence about Saddam Hussein’s regime continued into the 2004 
presidential election, generally induced by the misstatements of the candidates and campaigns themselves.  See Peter 
S. Canellos, Misperceptions linger, with candidates’ help, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 26, 2004; Glenn Kessler, Bush 
Recasts Rationale For War, WASH. POST, Oct. 10. 2004; Glenn Kessler & Jim VandeHei, Misleading Assertions 
Cover Iraq War and Voting Records, WASH. POST, Oct. 6, 2004, at A15; Dana Milbank, The Gap Between Closed 
Minds, Oct. 24, 2004, at A4. 
178  Indeed, manipulative information control, which includes not only withholding and selectively disclosing 
information but also “spinning” information in the most positive manner, has been a part of every modern American 
presidential administration.  See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, When Spin Spins Out of Control, NEW YORK TIMES, March 
21, 2004, Sect. IV, p. 1.   
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information within existing cultural and social frames.  At the moment a text ultimately has 
meaning for its audience, the receiver has decoded the text in a manner framed by individual 
social and cognitive structures of understanding that are in part determined by race, class, 
gender, educational background, and the like.179  Critiquing largely quantitative studies and 
behavioralist theories of media reception as a passive process in which an audience merely 
absorbs the pre-constituted meanings of broadcast messages, the ethnographic study of media 
audiences has revealed that “people actively and creatively make their own meanings and create 
their own culture.”180  The cultural study of media reception asserts that the act of “reading” a 
text—whether a soap opera, a television news show, or a report on the contents of a disclosed 
government document (or even, indeed, the document itself as it is reproduced in a newspaper or 
on a website)—constitutes a process of negotiation between media representations and the social 
experiences and background that structure the reader’s response.181  In the formal and social 
processes of reception, the “message” operates not as a mechanical signal that produces 
knowledge and certain behaviors, but is instead subject to the interpretive frames of individuals 
who are themselves parts of existing interpretive communities.   
 
At the same time that the public knows too little about information that is already 
available and responds actively to the information it is provided, a significant portion of the 
public also believes in, and imputes extraordinary significance to, the existence of false and even 
fantastic secret information.  Recent work in anthropology,182 political science,183 history,184 and 
cultural studies185 on American populism and conspiracy theory demonstrates the extent to which 
Americans (as well as members of other political cultures with populist tendencies) often 
perceive politics and other aspects of public life as controlled by secretive groups within or 
outside government.  Belief that power is concentrated disproportionately in secret public and 
private elites indicates a pervasive anxiety about secrecy that feeds off of, but does not 
                                                 
179  See Hall, supra note 154, at 130. 
180  Ien Ang, Culture and Communication: Towards an Ethnographic Critique of Media Consumption in the 
Transnational Media System, in WHAT IS CULTURAL STUDIES 237, 240 (John Storey ed., 1996); see also IEN ANG, 
DESPERATELY SEEKING THE AUDIENCE 170 (1991) (arguing that ethnographic studies of television audiences reveal 
the “multifaceted, fragmented and diversified repertoire of practices and experiences” of engaging with the mass 
media). 
181  This conception of the audience is most closely associated with the pioneering work of the British 
ethnographer and cultural studies theorist David Morley, who studied television news audiences in THE 
“NATIONWIDE” AUDIENCE: STRUCTURE AND DECODING (1980), and researched how the contexts of television 
viewing affect media reception in FAMILY TELEVISION: CULTURAL POWER AND DOMESTIC LEISURE (1986).  On the 
influence of Morley’s work on cultural studies, see Colin Sparks, Stuart Hall, Cultural Studies, and Marxism, in 
STUART HALL: CRITICAL DIALOGUES IN CULTURAL STUDIES 71, 93-94 (David Morley & Kuan-Hsing Chen eds., 
1996). 
182  See TRANSPARENCY AND CONSPIRACY: ETHNOGRAPHIES OF SUSPICION IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER (Harry 
G. West & Todd Sanders eds., 2003); PARANOIA WITHIN REASON: A CASEBOOK ON CONSPIRACY AS EXPLANATION 
(George E. Marcus ed., 1999). 
183  See JODI DEAN, PUBLICITY’S SECRET (2002). 
184  See MICHAEL KAZIN, THE POPULIST PERSUASION: AN AMERICAN HISTORY (rev. ed. 1998). 
185  See MARK FENSTER, CONSPIRACY THEORIES: SECRECY AND POWER IN AMERICAN CULTURE (1999); PETER 
KNIGHT, CONSPIRACY CULTURE: FROM KENNEDY TO THE X-FILES (2001). 
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necessarily react rationally towards, the existence of undisclosed government information.186  
When significant segments of the public believe that corruption or conspiracy permeate 
government, their desire for transparency becomes obsessive and their ability to rationally sort 
and interpret information suffers as a result.187  Consider, for example, a satirical book originally 
published in the late-1960s called Report from Iron Mountain.188  Intended to satirize Vietnam-
era official government reports, the book claimed to reproduce a leaked, semi-official document 
which concluded that war is essential in order to maintain a docile public and an expansive 
economy.  Since the moment of its publication, and repeatedly over the past twenty-five years, 
many political activists and conspiracy theorists considered the book to be documentary evidence 
of a soulless American government that survived by promoting unnecessary military operations 
and the ideological domination of its citizens.189  Some readers’ desire for secret government 
information, in other words, transformed a satire that resembled a leaked classified document 
into real, insidious evidence of government perfidy. 
 
Transparency theory, which assumes a public capable of correctly interpreting the 
meaning and significance of formerly secret government information, ignores the powerful role 
that secrecy plays in the cultural imaginary.  In his classic sociological treatment of the modern 
obsession with secrecy, Georg Simmel noted that the secret “produces an immense enlargement 
of life” and offers “the possibility of a second world alongside the manifest world.”190  The 
actual content of the secret—the information it contains—might in fact have negligible value, but 
to label information “secret” is to hint that it offers rarity and value, and may render the object a 
kind of fetish.191  According to Simmel, this can lead the public, which has limited access to the 
entity that withholds information, to assume that everything related to a secret is “important and 
essential” and requires more attention than the information that is known.192  Thus, secret, 
undisclosed government information takes on its own autonomous value, overwhelms the 
content it imbues with meaning and significance, and affects any effort to process and interpret 
information that ultimately is disclosed.193  Unless government operates in absolute 
transparency—a logistical impossibility—a populist public that is skeptical about the operations 
of government will always want more information, and will always suspect that essential 
                                                 
186  See Susan Harding & Kathleen Stewart, Anxieties of Influence: Conspiracy Theory and Therapeutic 
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information remains undisclosed.  Populist fears of secrecy, especially those that are deep-seated 
and lead to an all-encompassing distrust of the political order, cannot be sated through open 
government laws.194 
 
D. Conclusion: Transparency’s Frustrations 
By their nature, linear communications models simplify complex, historically situated 
processes.195  Sharing the assumptions of such models, transparency theory’s abstract normative 
commitments and consequentialist assumptions fail to consider and incorporate the complexity 
of bureaucratic practices, the communication process, and the interest and responsiveness of the 
public.  And building upon transparency theory’s normative, and consequentialist assumptions 
and its poor understanding of the state, communication, and the public, open government laws 
create two core frustrations:  they fail to tailor disclosure requirements, and as a result require too 
much of government in some instances and too little in others; and they fail to tailor the time and 
manner of disclosure, and as a result ignore the specific needs of the public. 
 
With respect to disclosure requirements, open government laws are both over- and under-
inclusive in their coverage.  In some instances, open government laws will defer excessively to 
claims of constitutional structure or national security, offering privileges to the state when none 
is due or when information is essential to produce an informed and, more importantly, 
knowledgeable and engaged public.  In other instances, open government laws impose excessive 
costs and constraints on government, and in the process impede government operations.  Those 
government entities and officials that can more easily utilize the inevitable gaps in disclosure 
requirements will do so; while those whose work cannot exploit such gaps or do not have the 
resources to resist disclosure requirements will be more open.  Thus, federal agencies and 
officials with broad FOIA exceptions, large discretionary budgets, and litigation support from the 
Department of Justice can resist FOIA requests to the greatest extent possible.196  By contrast, 
officials at the state and especially the local level, faced with state constitutional and statutory 
open government mandates while constrained with limited taxing authority and tighter budgetary 
constraints, are less able to avoid disclosure and will therefore be, for better or worse, more 
                                                 
194  See FENSTER, supra note 185, at 89-91.  Alan Favish’s efforts to use FOIA requests to disprove the 
conclusion of five separate investigations that Assistant White House Counsel Vincent Foster’s death was a suicide 
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SHANNON & WEAVER, supra note 165, at 25. 
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transparent.  Ironically, the level of government furthest in distance away from most Americans 
is the one best able to avoid openness requirements, while the level of government least able to 
afford the costs of transparency is the one most burdened with it.   
 
Because of their over- and under-inclusivity, open government laws cannot always 
deliver the core promise of transparency theory: that open governments govern optimally.  
Government changes its operations in response to open government laws, sometimes for the 
better and sometimes simply to avoid disclosure.  Faced with unavoidable openness 
requirements, state and local governments may operate in the way transparency theory 
anticipates by being more accountable in their actions, or they may decide to govern less, 
whether by choice or to avoid the financial and political costs of openness.  A document, 
controversial law, or meeting foregone is one that need not be disclosed.197  By contrast, federal 
agencies that face avoidable openness requirements may operate in the ways transparency theory 
anticipates, by disclosing what they must while keeping secret that which is best left undisclosed, 
or they may simply govern in a way to maximize their control over government information and 
fight all efforts to force disclosure.  In their theoretical abstractions and the breadth of its legal 
mandates and privileges, transparency theory and open government laws enable both sets of 
these variable results, and the frustrations that ensue for government and the public.198  
 
Similarly, open government laws fail to produce the presumed product of transparency, 
an informed, participatory democracy, because they explicitly ignore the public, the presumed 
user and beneficiary of open government, and as a result fail to tailor the time and manner of 
disclosure.  Open government laws focus solely on maximizing release of “government 
information,” a technical concept that, even if the laws prove successful in forcing disclosure, 
still leaves unmet the normative and utilitarian goals of better, more democratic government.  
They do not focus on improving the “knowledge” of an understanding, participatory, competent 
public.199  Nor do they consider the variable needs or interests a public might have for 
knowledge at particular moments—for example, immediately prior to an election or to a 
particularly important political policy decision facing legislators or governmental 
decisionmakers.  Furthermore, because of the kinds and breadth of the exceptions available 
under FOIA and constitutional doctrines of privilege, open government laws fail to enforce 
disclosure requirements in the areas of federal governmental performance where they are most 
needed: to evaluate decisions regarding such key political issues as national security and foreign 
                                                 
197  This is a version of the prescription Ilya Somin makes after reviewing evidence of voter ignorance—that if 
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relations.  In such instances, the public must rely on Congress to provide a watchdog 
function200—a task that Congress may find difficult to perform in the face of presidential 
resistance,201 or may perform poorly.202  Precisely when the public most needs transparency, it is 
unavailable.  Relying on a simplistic model of communication, transparency theory spawned the 
relatively blunt, frustrating instruments of open government laws.   
 
IV. SOME REALISM ABOUT TRANSPARENCY 
Transparency theory and open government law operate at too high a level of abstraction 
and form, and take too little account of the anticipated effects of disclosed information on 
governance and the public in the present—which should be the preeminent concern of open 
government law, given the normative and utilitarian ends that transparency is intended to 
achieve.  The quality of government operations and public participation in democracy may 
improve with increased information disclosure in some contexts, but not in others.203  As a 
general phenomenon and in particular cases, secrecy is both contextual, arising from a particular 
set of historical circumstances, and intentional, requiring some human agency working to 
withhold information from others.204  Accordingly, transparency’s goals require a context-
specific definition of transparency, viewed in terms of specific policy objectives, system 
constraints, and the costs and benefits of open government requirements, rather than an approach 
that regulates secrecy based on the presumed motivations of officials in the abstract.205  Context-
specific determinations may at times lead to less openness than present law requires, and may at 
other times lead to more transparency than current law and practice allow.  But they will more 
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-41- 
precisely meet the goals transparency theory identifies as the democratic and utilitarian bases for 
open government law.  To calibrate an optimal practice of open government, then, transparency 
theory must abandon equating the best government with the one that is most open—or, more 
precisely, with the one that appears most open based on its commitment to formal transparency 
requirements.  This final Part considers what such a determination would look like conceptually, 
substantively, and procedurally. 
 
A. The Costs and Benefits of Transparency 
As part of an initial inquiry, a legal regime intended to maximize transparency while it 
enables effective governance must realistically evaluate the benefits and costs of disclosure with 
as much precision as possible.206  At present, courts reviewing challenges under FOIA to 
government refusals to disclose documents generally do not make particularized considerations 
that weigh the respective value of disclosure and privilege.207  Benefits and costs look roughly 
like this:   
 
1. Benefits 
For the public and government agencies and officials alike, the benefits of any particular 
disclosure include the normative and consequential gains to government described above,208 as 
well as the savings enjoyed by government and private industry from the billions of dollars it 
costs to keep and protect secrets.209  Although such benefits are shared and spread across the 
entirety of the population and government as public goods, specific groups, whether by affinity 
or self-interest, experience transparency benefits in a more concentrated way.  Some groups, for 
example, represent both themselves and the general public in advocating for open government: 
the press, which has both a professional and commercial interest in information disclosure; 
NGOs focused on “freedom of information” issues; political opponents of the government that 
hope to expose information detrimental to the party and individuals in power; and current elected 
and appointed officials who want to publicize those policies that benefit their constituencies in 
particular and the public generally.   
 
2. Costs 
Disclosure requirements create costs to government operations in a number of ways: by 
forcing disclosures that actually harm national security, military actions, and law enforcement; 
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by inhibiting deliberative decisionmaking; and by imposing administrative costs incurred from 
opening meetings and disclosing documents.  As with benefits, these costs are largely spread 
throughout the population, but some individuals face more concentrated costs.  But elected and 
appointed officials, for example, experience personalized and specific reputational costs (and 
perhaps legal liability) from the disclosure of failed or unpopular policies and decisions.  
Additionally, private entities whose legal or illegal input into the public decisionmaking process 
would more likely be exposed and who would suffer reputational harms and increased risk of 
legal liability also face concentrated costs from disclosure.  These latter two disclosure “costs,” 
of course, may also be benefits to governance and to the public.  An open government regime 
must therefore be able to sort government claims about the excessive costs of any particular 
disclosure so that protections intended to minimize the spread costs to government are not used 
to minimize the concentrated reputational or political costs to individual officials.   
 
3. Obstacles to Imposing Optimal Disclosure Requirements 
Viewed this way, transparency advocates face at least two significant obstacles in their 
efforts to impose effective disclosure regimes.  First, they must assess the costs and benefits of 
any individual disclosure, as well as of various types of disclosure, with some accuracy—a 
difficult task, given the abstract nature of transparency’s normative and utilitarian goals.  If we 
cannot assume a linear, causal relationship between disclosure and public benefits, and if we 
demand some threshold of proof that disclosure will directly affect military operations, national 
security, or law enforcement investigations before we recognize a governmental privilege not to 
disclose, then divining a metric for cost-benefit analysis appears exceptionally difficult.  
Moreover, the public may be willing to accept some level of excessive secrecy in the protection 
of information (particularly relating to national security) whose disclosure would be more 
beneficial than costly, because the consequences of wrongful disclosure would be so grave.210 
 
Second, open government laws must vest institutional authority in an agent that can fairly 
and effectively enforce their mandates.  Most public records laws rely in the first instance on the 
compliance of the government officials or agency that produced the records—that is, the 
individuals who bear the concentrated costs that might be incurred by the records’ release.  
Public records laws typically rely in the second instance on courts, which tend to defer to 
officials’ declarations regarding the necessity of secrecy in some areas of governmental 
operations, such as law enforcement, military operations, and especially national security.211 As 
Judge Patricia Wald, former chief judge of the D.C. Circuit and author two decades earlier of a 
significant article extolling FOIA’s virtues,212 recently noted approvingly, the D.C. Circuit, 
which considers a significant proportion of the appeals over refusals to release the most 
politically sensitive presidential information, has been “reluctant to allow private citizens access 
                                                 
210  The willingness to bear this cost is analogous to the willingness of the victim of a contract breach to forego 
full compensation in order to keep secret a valuable interest.  The increment of cost the public absorbs constitutes a 
kind of “secrecy interest.”  See Omri Ben-Shahar & Lisa Bernstein, The Secrecy Interest in Contract Law, 109 YALE 
L.J. 1885, 1890-91 (2000). 
211  See Paul R. Verkuil, An Outcomes Analysis of Scope of Review Standards, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 679, 
714-15 (2002). 
212  See Patricia M. Wald, The Freedom of Information Act: A Short Case Study in the Perils and Paybacks of 
Legislating Democratic Values, 33 EMORY L.J. 649 (1984). 
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to presidential information via the use of statutes passed by Congress to regulate the executive 
branch generally”—despite strong textual arguments that signal congressional intent 
otherwise.213  The Rehnquist Court in particular has been unkind to an expansive vision of 
FOIA.214  As a result, federal open government laws, as well as analogous laws in many states, 
fail to establish an institutional structure that can effectively evaluate the costs and benefits of 
disclosure, particularly when the government information at issue is controversial and risks 
harming the officials who play a central role in the disclosure process.   
 
In the two sections that follow, I offer some initial suggestions, based on current but 
underutilized programs or proposals, as to how the problems of substantive assessment and 
institutional structure could begin to be resolved.   
 
B. The Decisions of Governance and the Time Value of Information. 
Open government laws should focus most closely on maximizing benefits and 
minimizing costs to two sets of decisions and actions: those decisions made in the first instance 
by government, and those decisions made in the second instance by the public.  The government 
must be able to protect its decisional process from the interference that excessive scrutiny brings, 
while the public must be able to evaluate the government’s decision as soon as possible—and, 
where possible and appropriate, before a final decision is made.  To do so, the public must have 
access to not merely, and perhaps not even, a comprehensive quantity of information explaining 
the government’s decision, but, equally important, the most comprehensible presentation of 
information, as soon as possible.215  What matters, then, is the use that government and the 
public make of information, how best to optimize that use, and when the disclosure of 
information will hurt or aid in that use.    
 
Secrecy during the decision-making process can, in some cases, be defensible; once the 
process is over, however, the need to protect governmental deliberations diminishes considerably 
while the need for the public to have access to the information on which the governmental 
deliberations were based is much greater.216  In some instances, disclosure of government 
information will unquestionably benefit the public while it creates only the administrative costs 
to government of making the information available.  Open government laws, and especially 
those that require government agencies to make information available electronically on the 
Internet, handle these instances easily.217  Instances in which the costs and benefits are mixed, or 
in which disclosures that would be beneficial to the public but potentially costly to the operations 
of government agencies, are more difficult.  In such situations, both government agencies and the 
party that resolves disputes and/or enforces the open government law would more effectively 
                                                 
213  See Patricia M. Wald & Jonathan R. Siegel, The D.C. Circuit and the Struggle for Control of Presidential 
Information, 90 GEO. L. J. 737, 766-67 (2002). 
214  See Verkuil, supra note 211, at 715-16. 
215  Cf. Fung et al., supra note 2, at 39 (arguing that effective information-based regulation promoting 
transparency in the private sector requires information to be available in comprehensive form). 
216  See Posner, supra note 171, at 50. 
217  See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1), (2) (FOIA provision requiring agencies to make certain types of information 
available to the public); 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2)(E) (requiring agencies to make certain types of information available 
by “computer telecommunications” or “other electronic means”). 
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further the aims of transparency theory by balancing the degree to which the public, if given the 
information, could make an informed political choice in the short-term, against the likely short- 
and long-term costs on the particular entity or entities that would disclose the information and on 
broader government operations.218  The proximity and gravity of the public’s political decision, 
in other words, should be considered alongside the type and value of the information and the 
costs of its disclosure to government 
 
Such determinations must also consider the time value of the information requested—
both in terms of the benefits to the public of its rapid disclosure and the benefits to the 
government of its temporary non-disclosure.  Although the cost of information disclosure may 
outweigh its benefits at one moment—especially before the government’s decisional process or a 
particular government action is complete—the benefits of disclosure may outweigh the costs at a 
later moment.  Stringent open meeting laws that require all discussions by a governmental entity 
to be open to the public may impose excessive constraints on deliberation that could be avoided 
by at least temporarily excluding the public.  Conversely, classification regulations may enable 
government agencies to keep information secret long after any threat of their disclosure is past—
and so far into the future that its benefits to the public have significantly diminished.  For 
example, consider the issues at play when secret information would be exceptionally valuable to 
the public as it prepares to vote or to express public support or opposition to an important 
governmental decision—such as the decision to declare war.  In that context, legal requirements 
or political pressure that will lead the government to release pertinent information may create 
high costs, but may in fact be necessary for a functional democracy.  Keeping such information 
from the public because it falls within a particular exemption or because it qualifies for secrecy 
classification may or may not be detrimental to the public, depending upon the particular context 
and time in which the issue arises. 
 
Such flexibility creates significant instability and indeterminacy.  Government 
information laws already consider time as a factor for disclosure, though typically by using blunt 
measurements.  For example, “sunshine laws” implicitly assert that time matters by requiring the 
simultaneous production and release of information through open meetings, while the Executive 
Order establishing classification policy in the Executive Branch establishes various durations 
after which declassification should either be automatic or considered.219  But intellectual 
property law recognizes the time value of information in various contexts, and provides a variety 
of means to protect rights flexibly, based on information’s diminishing value.220  Recognizing 
                                                 
218  Individual determinations of this balance may create additional administrative costs unless a better 
substantive and institutional approach leads federal agencies to curb their expensive practice of overclassification. 
219  See Exec. Order No. 13,292, 68 Fed. Reg. 15315, §§ 1.5, 3.1 (2003) (setting forth duration of classification 
and procedures for declassification and downgrading).  The slowness with which many agencies are declassifying 
documents makes the “automatic” declassification requirements that were originally based on a number of years 
significantly more flexible than they were presumably intended.  See Information Security Oversight Office, Report 
to the President: An Assessment of Declassification in the Executive Branch (Nov. 30, 2004), available at 
http://www.archives.gov/isoo/reports/2004_declassification_report.html. 
220  For example, courts have narrowly protected the advantage that being first in the market with information 
bestows.  See, e.g., International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918) (protecting the right of “hot 
news” provider from copying); NBA v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 852 (2d Cir. 1997). (citing INS, 248 U.S. at 
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the significance of the time value of information, like recognizing the importance of the use the 
public will make of information in their political decisions, would make the institution that 
adjudicates and oversees mediation of disclosure disputes better able to consider and implement 
transparency’s ends than merely considering abstract mandates and the applicability of broad 
exemptions.221 
 
C. Institutional Oversight of Open Government Laws 
If more precise measures of costs and benefits are more likely to achieve transparency’s 
ends than focusing on the type or medium of information, then determining a proper institutional 
locus of determining costs and benefits is essential.  Federal open government law relies on 
judicial resolution of challenges to agency determinations about the applicability of disclosure 
requirements and exemptions.  Non-judicial resolution of government information disputes has 
served the often contentious arguments between Congress and the President over presidential and 
executive branch information reasonably well.222  This is true even for disputes over intelligence 
                                                                                                                                                             
231) (including evaluation of the time sensitivity of information’s value in test under appropriation in “hot news” 
context); Restatement (Third) Unfair Competition, § 38 cmt. c. (“The originator of valuable information or other 
intangible assets normally has an opportunity to exploit the advantage of a lead time in the market. This can provide 
the originator with an opportunity to recover the costs of development and in many cases is sufficient to encourage 
continued investment.”).  Similarly, owners of trade secrets that have been misappropriated may be awarded an 
injunction against the information’s use for a limited period of time, either until the trade secret has ceased to exist 
or until any commercial advantage the competitor gained by its misappropriation has ceased to exist.  See UNIF. 
TRADE SECRETS ACT § 2(a).  Courts may issue temporary injunctions that are temporally limited per se or 
permanent injunctions that are limited only until such time as the information becomes available otherwise.  See 
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 473 (1974) (upholding permanent injunction to enforce 
confidentiality agreements until trade secrets were released to or become available to the public); Sigma Chemical 
Co. v. Harris, 794 F.2d 371, 375 (8th Cir. 1986) (rejecting temporally unlimited injunction).  Although the federal 
patent and copyright statutes also explicitly consider the time value of information in providing temporary limited 
monopoly rights over certain types of information, they do so through blanket time periods.  See 35 U.S.C. § 
532(a)(2) (twenty year term for patents); 17 U.SC. § 304 (establishing various terms of protections for copyrighted 
or copyrightable materials). 
221  See Mark H. Grunewald, Freedom of Information Act Dispute Resolution, 40 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 37 (1988). 
222  See Neal Devins, Congressional-Executive Information Access Disputes: A Modest Proposal—Do Nothing, 
48 ADMIN. L. REV. 109, 116-25 (1996); Peter M. Shane, Negotiating for Knowledge: Administrative Responses to 
Congressional Demands for Information, 44 ADMIN. L. REV. 197 (1992).  Admittedly, neither interbranch conflicts 
nor state government information pose identical sets of issues as federal open government laws.  The interbranch 
relationship differs significantly from the state-public relationship in quite significant ways.  On the one hand, some 
dynamics within the relations will lead to better negotiations: the President often must negotiate with Congress in 
order to create and preserve a trusting, reciprocal, long-term relationship to achieve other goals, while the President 
and Congress may share general policy goals in some areas (such as, for example, national security), and may be 
equally averse to the political risks involved in high-stakes informational disputes.  See Shane, supra, at 221-22.   
Nevertheless, persistent political competition between the branches and background legal uncertainty may pull the 
parties in opposite directions, leading either to Congressional efforts to force the President to divulge information 
Congress doesn’t need, or to Presidential efforts to keep information secret against statutory mandates and for purely 
political reasons.  See id. at 222-26.  But because judicial resolution of interbranch informational disputes strain the 
limits of politics and justiciability and often prove frustrating for all three branches, most proposals for reform (or in 
favor of the status quo) stress the value of negotiated solutions, whether through formal, generalized agreements 
over the procedural and substantive frameworks for dispute resolution, or through a more amorphous commitment to 
compromise.  See generally Jonathan L. Entin, Executive Privilege and Interbranch Comity After Clinton, 8 WM. & 
MARY BILL RTS. J. 657, 660-68 (2000) (summarizing arguments against judicial resolution of interbranch 
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activities, which pose very difficult political and national security issues.223  But interbranch 
disputes between relatively equal parties operate in the shadow of constitutional crisis; the 
Congress and President seek judicial resolution at great risk, and the Judiciary faces similar 
danger in trying to settle such disputes.  Lacking such underlying political and legal gravity, 
disputes between the public and Executive do not lead as naturally to a non-judicial institutional 
solution, despite the fact that such disputes can raise similar constitutional issues if an agency 
resists its duties under FOIA.  Because transparency theory does not consider thoroughly the 
complex institutional dimension of government information production and protection, it is 
unsurprising that open government laws fail to design democratic institutions that can organize 
and regulate information in order to achieve the goals on which the underlying theory is based.224   
 
For open government laws to be more effective, then, they must create and vest authority 
in non-judicial institutions that can develop expertise in overseeing informational disputes 
between members of the public and government agencies, and that can perform more 
individualized inquiries into the costs and benefits of disclosure.225  Such institutions could take 
a number of forms, some of which have been proposed at the federal level or adopted at the state 
level.  Classification review boards can provide preemptive review of agency overclassification, 
whether as a general practice, with respect to certain events or issues, or in response to public 
requests.226  Vesting adjudicative authority in a separate administrative agency or a department 
within an existing agency, as at least one state has done to strengthen its public records act,227 
                                                                                                                                                             
informational disputes and in favor of negotiated settlements); but see Wald & Siegel, supra note 213, at 750-60 
(arguing that judicial resolution of interbranch disputes is often essential, and touting the D.C. Circuit’s record in 
providing just and effective resolutions). 
223  See Shane, supra note 222, at 215. 
224  Cf. John Ferejohn, Instituting Deliberative Democracy, in NOMOS XLII: DESIGNING DEMOCRATIC 
INSTITUTIONS 75, 86-87 (Ian Shapiro & Stephen Macedo eds., N.Y.U. Press 2000) (arguing that theories proposing 
an ideal deliberative democracy too seldom consider issues of institutional design).  
225  Cf. Fung et al., supra note 2, at 38-39 (arguing that effective information-based regulation promoting 
transparency in the private sector requires strong political intermediaries to represent those who use the disclosed 
information).  Such institutions must be independent from the agencies that they oversee, unlike, for example, the 
Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel, which is composed of senior-level representatives from 
Departments of State, Defense, and Justice, the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Archives, and the 
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.  See Exec. Order No. 12,958, 60 Fed. Reg. 19825 (1995). 
226  See Public Interest Declassification Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-567, tit. VII, 114 Stat. 2856 (codified at 
50 U.S.C. § 435 (2003)) (establishing Public Interest Declassification Board in order, among other things, “to 
promote the fullest possible public access to a thorough, accurate, and reliable documentary record”).  Despite the 
Act’s passage, the Board has gone unfunded and President Bush has failed to appoint a full slate of members.  See 
Testimony of Representative Christopher Shays, Chairman, Subcommittee On National Security, Emerging Threats, 
and International Relations, Committee on House Government Reform, Hearing on Information Overclassification, 
March 2, 2005, 2005 WLNR 3243312.  Another example is the Assassination Records Review Board, established in 
the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992, 44 U.S.C. § 2107 (1994), which during the 
period of its existence evaluated the decisions by federal agencies not to release records relating to the assassination. 
227  See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-205 (establishing a “Freedom of Information Commission,” with the authority, 
among other things, to investigate alleged violations of state’s Freedom of Information Act); see generally Robert G. 
Vaughn, Administrative Alternatives and the Federal Freedom of Information Act, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 185, 193-200 
(1984) (describing and analyzing Connecticut’s law). 
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may also provide greater institutional support for public requesters.228  Finally, Congress or 
individual agencies could establish an ombudsman with authority and expertise in mediating 
FOIA disputes,229 as one state has successfully accomplished for disputes arising from its own 
public records act.230 
 
CONCLUSION 
Transparency and open government are at once impossible and necessary.  Impossible, 
because in their strongest form they rely upon an inappropriate model of information and 
communication to produce an inaccurate understanding of government information, which 
results in an often ineffective legal regime.  Necessary, because a state that lacks transparency 
and open government is undemocratic.  The task for those on all sides of the debate surrounding 
open government is to consider institutional and substantive approaches that would better 
achieve the essential ends that transparency theory seeks. 
 
                                                 
228  See Grunewald, supra note 221, at 37-45 (1988) (proposing “Information Access Authority,” either within 
existing agencies or as a new, separate agency, to adjudicate and mediate FOIA disputes); Vaughn, supra note 227, 
at 209-12 (considering potential usefulness of Connecticut’s Freedom of Information Commission model for the 
reform of FOIA). 
229  See Grunewald, supra note 221, at 56-64.  Legislation currently before both houses of Congress would 
create an Office of Government Information Services within the Administrative Conference of the United States to 
“offer mediation services between persons making requests under section 552 and administrative agencies as a non-
exclusive alternative to litigation and, at the discretion of the Office, issue advisory opinions if mediation has not 
resolved the dispute.”  See Openness Promotes Effectiveness in our National Government Act of 2005, H.R. 867, 
109th Cong. (2005) § 11; OPEN Government Act of 2005, S. 394, 105th Cong. (2005), § 11 (creating Office of 
Government Information Services that will house a FOIA ombudsman to “mediate disputes between FOIA 
requestors and agencies”). 
230  See Fla. Stat. §16.60 (2004) (establishing public records mediation program within the office of the state 
Attorney General); see generally Kimball, supra note 17, at 354-57 (describing Florida’s mediation program and 
that of other states). 
